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Cert. to Ga. Supreme Ct. 
(Ingram, et al.; Gunter, 
dissenting without 
opinion) 
State/Criminal (Capital case) 
Timely 
1 ~ SUMMARY: This is a Capital Case. A stay has been granted 
b y t he lower court. Petr presents two additional constitutional 
c hallenges to his conviction. 
2 e FACTS and CONTENTIONS: Petr was found guilty of r ape, 




a pena l ins t i tut ion and received substantial and consecutive 
prison s entences on the last four offenses, the combined length 
of wh ich was rendered somewhat irrelevant by a sentence of death 
imposed upon the rape charge., Petr's princjpal claim is that 
the death sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth AmendmentsF 
both in general and in its application to him through the pro-
cedures used by the State of Georgiae In this claim he echoesp 
and specifically adopts by reference, the arguments made by the 
petr in Eberheart v., Georgia, No. 74-5174, which is being held 
for Fowlerc This case would also be a simple hold for Fowler 
except that petr presents two other constitutional challenges to 
his conviction., 
First is a claim based upon Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.,S., 162 
-(1975) and Pate v., Robinson, 383 u.s. 375 (1966), that he was 
denied due process because the State did not adequately determine 
whether he was competent to stand trial. He raised his in-
90mpetency contention prior to trial and, pursuant to Ga., statutory 
procedures, a psychiatrist was appointed by the court to examine 
petr. After this examination had been conducted, a hearjng was 
heldp before a jury, to determine whether petr was me~ly 
capable of understanding the proceedjngs against him and capable 
of properly assisting his attorney in his defense. At this 
hearing petr testified and, according to the State's response, 
( 
seemed intelligent, displayed--an accurate memory and was - responsive 
to questions on both direct - and cross-examination. The psychiatrist 
was generally inconclusiveo He - opined that latent mental disorders 
were indicated but that he could not arrive at a conclusive 
diagnosiso He apparently ducked a direct question as to whether 
petr was competent, but did answer questions on cross indicating 
petr could understand the nature of the proceedings against himo 
The warden and a prison paramedic at the institution from which 
petr had escaped also testified, indicating that petr had not 
seemed abnormal to them. On this evidence the jury found petr 
( compe tent to stand tr ial. -
'-' 
Petr's alternative claim is based upon the Confrontation 
Clause o_f the Sixth Amendment. The court reporter failed to 
record the voir dire of the jury except for objections raised 
by counsel. After his conviction, the State moved to correct 
this error by means of supplementing the record through an 
evidentiary hearing. Petr's counsel objected on the ground that 
petr should be returned from the state prison and present at any 
proceeding, but his objectjon was overruled. The State called 
the Clerk of the trial court and questioned him at length 
regarding the procedures utilized at the voir dire. The court 
( made findings of fact regarding what had transpired, and these 
'--' 
were transmitted to the Ga. Supreme Court along with the original 
record. In affirming the judgment entered on petr's conviction, 
( -4-
that ~ court rejected his claim that he had an absolute right 
to be present at the post-trial proceedings. The court characterjzed 
tbis proceeding as simply an administrative hearing, at which petr 
was adequately represented by counsel. 
3o DISCUSSION: Since the normal disposition of this case 
~0uld be a Hold, I assume the Court will not want to consider the 
@er its of petr's other constitutional contentions at this point 
~~less i t is clear they can be dealt with summarily or have such 
ingependent importance as to demand plenary consideration. While 
neither claim is frivolous, I don't believe they meet these 
standards. 
The Drope/Pate due process claim seems decidedly weaker than 
that presented in those cases. Here Ga. not only provides a 
procedural safeguard for defendants' right not to be tried while 
incompetent, as did Illinois in Pate and Missouri in Drope, it 
also afforded petr that procedure. Petr's claim is that the 
evidence actually introduced was i.nsufficient to resolve the 
issue. He is surely correct that limiting the psychiatrist's 
ability to make a complete diagnosis would in some cases be 
equivalent to affording no procedure at all, but it isn't clear 
that this is such a case or that the elements which persuaded the 
Court to reexamine the "fact"Yquestion of competence are present 




-:in: this case-., There is hotning in the moving papers indicating 
why the psychiatrist felt himself unable to do whatever else 
wa·s- necessary to complete his dia-gnosis, how and/or by whom his 
examination was limited, and whether any objection was made., 
There is _!10 .qtention of any request for a continuance until the 
psychiatrist felt willing to extend a diagnosis. Moreover, 
other than· the psychiatrist's equivocation there is really no 
evidence supporting the claim of incompetence, and certainly 
nothing of the bizarre nature of the histories recited in Pate and 
Drope~ To accept petr's claim would seem to require that upon 
demand a state must afford sufficient time, procedures, facilities, 
etco so that a court-appointed psychiatrist can form a 11 conclusive" 
diagnosis as to a defendant's competence before that defendant may 
be tried., 
Petr's confrontation clause argument is somewhat easier to 
dismiss., There appear to be three fairly good answers to his 
contention: the Clerk of the Court was not strictly a "witness 
against him" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment; the 
right to be present is predicated on the right to assist defense 
counsel in one's defense, but where the proceeding was to explore 
the actions taken at voir dire by the prosecuting attorney and 
defense counsel, petr could have been of no assistance in the 
J:?.e~ring~ and, the underlying substantive claim upon which this 





sole purpose of the· post-trial .hearing was to build a record 
for reviewing whether any jurors were impermissibly excluded 
for cause; but the court found that no jurors had been excluded 
for cause, and petr has not challenged this determinationo 
There is a response. 
11/7/75 -:.Egge 1 ing 
.. -- - . --
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NOT VOTING 
No. 75-5444 Coker v. Georgia --- ---
I guess that this is the rape case you should ~rant, 
if only because the others are so unsuitable. Petitioner 
was convicted of rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, car theft, 
and escape from prison. The death sentence was imposed only 
on the rape count. There are twg other noncertworthy questions 
one involving the determ~~~~~q~ · or petitioner's coThpetency 
to stand trial aq~ __ the other~'wne~er the Sixth knendment right 
to confrontation ;Mr violated by the failure to permit petitioner 
to come from prison to be present a a post-trial hearing to 
reconstruct part of the voir dire (petitioner's counsel was 
present). 
March 25, 1977 
BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Dave Martin 
No . 75-5444 Coker v. Georgia 
The question is whether the death penalty is a constittu-
under the Eighth Amendment 
tionally permissible punishment/for the crime of rape. The 
question may be viewed more narrowly, since the facts of 
this case call for decision only with respect to non-aggravated 
rape . There was no brutalizing of the victimf here, beyond 
the act of rape itself. 
identified somewhat 
Gregg v. Georgia/asxakliskaa three/overlapping inquiries 
for answering the eighth Amendment question: Does the 
punishment comport with evolving standards of decency? 
Is it compatible with human dignity? Is it disproportionate 
to the offense? 
I don't find the second factor useful here. The third 
seems to call for a somewhat less historical, more a priori 
inquiry than the first. Petr · 1; has a solid argument 
'"' .....H...t ta.'-sfn,.c.f-. 
against the death penalty based on disproportionA Gregg, 
Roberts and the other cases emphasized several a times the 
uniqueness of the death penalty. By th~same token, imposing 
death on one's victim is a unique kind of crime. There are 
some kinds of brutalizing assaults that offend us, perhaps, 
~~ 
as much as murder, but .._.~may be largely because they 
demonstrate that the offender was indifferent to the life 
of the victim--he might as well have killed the victim. In 
-2-
any event, there is a clear dividing line between murder and 
assault that does not result in death, and there is certainly 
some disproportion k.e.KH.e.eR when the state takes the life of 
By the standard of the 
an offender who himself has taken no life . /fk.e biblical 
maxim "an eye for an eye',' H.RHi.lixx.eR.Ii.ex capital punishment 
is 
in such circumstances/disproportionate. 
Moreover, this case does not present the difficult 
question of /II comparing the death penalty to grossly 
brutal assaults. Rape is always an awful offense, but 
petr's action here --this time--was not brutal. 
It seems to me, however, that the most important inquiry 
for th's case is the fixxxxfixxx.RR first one specified in 
Gregg: evolving community standards. There are two primary 
objective indicators: legislative judgments and jury 
determinations. Petr has set forth the statistics in.._ 
his brief, and there seems to be little quarrel over the 
statistics; the fight is over their significance. Rougly 
20 states imposed death for rape in the early 20th century. 
This declined--but insignificantly, in my view--to 17 by the 
time Furman was decided. After Furman only three states 
LG-a.- \ N .t.} ~. \ \ 
reenacted the death penalty for rape of adultsl\while three 
had some such provision for sexual battery of children. 
After Woodson only one adult-rape provision survives--Georgia's. 
And the Louisiana legislature, cc ting in response to Roberts, 
death ,._ 
did not revive its/penalty for rape, nori have any of the 
other legislatures acting since Woodson and Roberts seen fit 
to •••~r••~ impese the tleath penalty~~" ~ , 
Resp replies--and this seems to me the heart of the issue 
-3-
here--that these post-Furman statistics cannot be counted for 
too much. This Court in Woodson in fact counted certain 
post-Furman statistics for little (the fact that 10 jurisdictions 
had opted for mandatory death penalty schemes), and resp 
says the Court should do the same here. Resp argues that 
the failure to reimpose the penalty for rape Was not a 
~ ~ ;~ D-'1"- f""~i$"""--*1 
considered legislative judgment -'Aexcessive. :Abut rather 
merely the result of some confusion over Furman's reach. Most 
importantly, resp argues that the states that chose mandatory 
death penalty schemes may have left rape off only because 
of the mandatory nature of the penalty--they might do differently 
under a Georgia-type statute • 
.a:_n m~r opiniOlil; the 'i'tati'i'tii'iil iUi' A uery 'i'trolilg 'i''ltJfleYt! foi 
• pet:r s I eaftftee 8888 a~ge~ f18 IRQ'i' t.. of resp' s ar.gumen t . Em r IIR 
Petr also invokes the statistics showing jury determinations. 
They generally show axfaiixfaixiJxlsw that death is imposed as 
a punishment for rape only in a small number of cases. Perftaps 
most significant are the data from Georgia alone. Since Furman 
appellate 
there have been 42 reparted/cases where the defendant was 
convicted of rape. In only four did the jury impose the 
death penalty. (Petr's supplemental brief updates the statistics: 
the rate is now 4 out of 63.) Resp does not dispute these 
data. 
objective 
In my opinion, these figures amount to a strong/showing 
that evolving societal standards reject capital punishment 
as an acceptable penalty for th~rime of rape. 
-4-
Particularly important are the actions of the legislatures. 
I do not agree with resp that the dramat~c attrition after 
... Furman can be attributed solely to confusion about the 
import of that case. Thirty-five states completely revamped 
their death penalty laws after that decision, necessarily 
giving careful attention to what the Members of this Court 
said in Furman. I know of nothing that would have ~xa~me 
prompted them to think death fer rape would not be permissibleJ 
i{! +(.4y QA\C.I~.&.W. ~ SO\M4. so ... +s o~ C!Pfl iiD.l. f14~isk~ wt.v« ~II CJN~t.·~..,..~ . 
Ainstead, I think this reaction to Furman points strongly in 
petr's favor. That case was the occasion for ..-.careful 
rethinking of capital punishment statutes. Although only 3 states 
had abandoned ~ this punishment for rape in the preceding 
• 50 years, 8'ztb·a• zgl g § i · 1 14 other states gave it up 
when finally presented with an occasion for thoroughgoing 
revision. After Roberts, a 15th state joined dis list--Louisiana. 
There is one other factor to note. This evolving standard 
has not generally distinguished between aggravated rapes and 
non-brutal rapes. The death penalty in the overwhelming 
majority of states is not available for any rape. In part 
this may be the product of the difficulty in defining aggravated 
0.. 
rape in1fway that meaningfully differentiates it from 
1\ 
"ordiinary" rape, a difficulty you noted in Furman. 408 
u.s., at 460 . If this trend is to be read as rejection of 
the death penalty for any rape, then it might make sense 
to write the opinion to make that clear, even though the 
issue is not .. L Jj technically presented by the facts of this 
case. 
-5-
Finally, I xaHlaxRakx£aRxia do not think ~~Hxaxa your 
vote here is foreordained one way 6r the other by your position 
in Furman. There you explicitly rejected the contention that 
capital punishment is unconstitutional when the crime is 
rape. 408 U.S., at 456-461. But much has happened since 
.. then. Your decision in Gregg, etc., accepted .. the 
result in Furman as authoritative precedent, and your 
position in last term's capital cases bespeaks a different 
stance from that assumed in Furman--rightly so, iRx in view 
of the rule of stare decisis. 
D.M. 
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March 31, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 75-5444, Coker v. Georgia 
No. 76-5206, Roberts v. Louisiana 
I was asked to assign the opinions in 
these two cases. Byron has agreed to under-
take an op·inion in Coker, and John Stevens has 





Arguing About Death for Rape · 
As the nine black-robed Justices 
walked purposefully to their places at 
the U.S. Supreme Court bench last week, 
the ornate courtroom seemed even more 
somber than usual. Nine months before, 
the court had allowed the imposition of 
the death penalty for murder. Now it 
was being asked to permit capital pun-
ishment for crimes in which no life has 
been taken. The state of Georgia was 
seeking permission to electrocute Ehr-
lich Anthony Coker for the rape of a I 6-
year-old housewife. 
Coker's attorney, Civil Rights Law-
yer David E. Kendall , candidly recited 
the ugly details of the crime: 
Late on a balmy summer night in 
1974, the kitchen door of Allen and El-
nita Carver's two-room house was sud-
denly thrown open. In stepped Coker, 
24, a convicted rapist and murderer who 
had just escaped from a nearby prison. 
Brandishing a three-foot board, Coker 
forced Mrs. Carver, who was still recov-
ering from the birth of a son three weeks 
earlier, to help tie up her husband in 
the bathroom. That done, he grabbed a 
steak knife and assaulted her. He then 
took her with him as he fled in the Carv-
er car. Sheriff's deputies captured him 
on a dead-end road a few hours later. 
plied. Powell drove the point home: 
"The same punishment he had before." 
Ironically, Coker received solid legal 
backing in a friend-of-court brief filed by 
seven organizations promoting women's 
rights, including the National Organiza-
tion for Women . These groups demand-
ed effective punishment for rapists, but 
they charged that the death penalty is 
ineffective because the severity of the 
punishment supports demands for elab-
orate and often humiliating testing of the 
victim's testimony. Even so, the femi-
nists argued, juries sometimes acquit an 
accused rapist because they feel that the 
punishment might be too extreme. 
Badly Split. When Georgia Assis-
tant Attorney General E. Dean Grin-
dle warned the court that elimination 
of capital punishment for non-death 
crimes might have unforeseeable con-
sequences, he found Justice Harry A. 
Blackmun already alarmed. A vote for 
Coker, said Blackmun, would have "an 
adverse effect on federal efforts" to im-
pose death for treason, espionage and 
terrorism. But Justice Potter Stewart 
hinted that some crime victims might 
suffer if capital punishment were ex-
tended: "The rapist, for example, might 
be encouraged to kill since the penalty 
would be the same." 
Although the main battle on restor-
ing the death penalty was fought in 
1976, last week's hour-long arguments 
-------
and questions were an important skir-
mish over the extension of capital pun-
ishment. The court is badly split, and 
while some expansion of the death pen-
alty is probable, there is no way of know-
ing Coker's fate until the Justices an-
nounce it, probably this June. 
The Last Word 
When William 0 . Douglas reluc-
tantly retired from the U.S. Supreme 
Court I 7 months ago at the age of 77. 
he was partly paralyzed from a stroke. 
in almost constant pain and seemingly 
unable to continue the mental exertion 
required on the high bench. Friends 
feared that the Justice, deprived of of-
ficial duties, might soon die. Instead, 
Douglas is still working away in his court 
chambers, and the old conservationist 
has promised friends that he will make 
his first public reappearance next month 
at the official dedication of the Ches-
apeake & Ohio Canal National Histor-
ical Park as a memorial to him. He has 
also passed along word that he will send 
the final manuscript of his 43rd work, 
the second half of his autobiography, to 
his publisher this spring. The volume 
will cover his spirited court years, and 
once again Douglas will enjoy the last 
word on many of his critics. 
Douglas' fellow Justices, fearing 
damage to the court's work and unseem-
ly publicity about his impaired mental 
abilities, had prodded him to retire. 
They quietly denied him the authority 
Georgia is the only state with a law 
calling for the death penalty for rape of 
an adult woman (Florida and Mississip-
pi provide for execution for the rape of 
children). A local jury, after noting Cok-
er's previous convictions for rape-mur-
der and rape-kidnaping, ordered him to 
the electric chair. But Attorney Kendall 
contended before the Supreme Court 
Justices that death was so infrequently 
inflicted on rapists that its imposition vi-
olated the constitutional ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment. Of 42 men 
convicted of rape in Georgia since 1973, 
3.8 received only prison sentences. 
FORMER JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS WITH WIFE CATHY & COURT AIDE 
Although both Coker and his vic-
iim were white, Kendall marshaled his-
torical and statistical data to show that 
execution for rape was based on race. 
Before the Civil War, Georgia Jaw was 
typical of Southern statutes in specifying 
that a white man raping a black wom-
an could draw a fine or imprisonment 
"at the discretion of the court," while a 
slave or "free person of color" even at-
tempting to rape a white woman could · 
be put to death. Supposedly color-blind 
postwar Jaws were selectively enforced: 
since 1930, when accurate record keep-
ing was started, 89% of the 455 rapists 
executed in the U.S. have been black. 
At one point, Justice Lewis F. Pow-
ell Jr. of Virginia frostily asked Ken-
dall: "What would be an appropriate 
punishment for a convicted rapist serv-
ing life who escapes and commits an-
other rape?" Incarceration, Kendall re-
80 
THE LAW 
to write majority court opinions and 
postponed all cases in which he might 
cast a tie-breaking vote. Though rela-
tions were amiable on the surface, other -
Justices had long been annoyed by 
Douglas' personal habits, which includ-
ed hogging the court limousine, using 
court secretaries for commercial writing 
and verbally bullying his colleagues dur-
ing closed-door conferences. 
On the day he retired , Douglas wait-
ed all afternoon in his chambers for his 
colleagues to pay their respects, but only 
William Brennan and Byron White 
showed up. ("We had all shaken his 
hand when his decision was announced 
at lunch," explains one Justice.) The 
next week, Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger called Douglas' three law clerks 
in for tea, mentioned budget problems 
and pointedly asked them if they had 
any job prospects. At the request of the 
other Justices, Burger also wrote Doug-
las suggesting that he move from his cen-
trally located chambers to a "more com-
modious" office in a distant corner of 
the building. 
Douglas shot back a note saying he 
would stay where he was. He sarcas-
tically used the word commodious five 
times to describe his satisfaction with 
his traditional quarters. To keep his per-
quisites, Douglas assumed the offensive, 
advancing the novel idea that a retired 
Justice retains the right to issue opin-
ions in court cases of his choosing. Se-
rious or not, Douglas made his point: 
he now operates with a secretary, a Li-
brary of Congress researcher, a driver-
messenger, and a law clerk, who assists 
in rewriting his latest book. 
On a typical day, the gaunt, hollow-
eyed Douglas is bundled into his court 
office by late morning, dawdles over cor-
respondence, takes a nap and then ad-
dresses his manuscript. He tires rapidly 
and is usually taken home by midafter-
noon. Burger has become solicitous of 
Douglas' welfare, attending small social 
events staged by Douglas and his fourth 
wife, Cathy, 33, and sending over gifts 
of vintage wine and tasty apricot and or-
angejam put up by Burger himself. 
Look Bad. Happily for the Burger 
regime, Douglas' book will contain lit-
tle criticism of recent court appointees. 
The first draft, completed before the 
stroke, contained savage scolding about 
Burger's management of the court, but 
later versions concentrate on Douglas' 
foes of earlier eras. Says one associate: 
"Felix Frankfurter won't be butchered, 
but he'll be needled to death." 
Uthe published work is circumspect, 
Douglas has kept one last weapon in re-
serve: upon his death, his entire collec-
tion of meticulous notes and papers from 
the court's secret conferences will be 
opened to public inspection at the Li-
brary of Congress, an unprecedented bo-
nanza for court watchers. "There's some 
amazing stuff in there," says one for-
mer clerk. "Douglas is a skilled writer, 
and he knows exactly how to make his 
adversaries look bad." 
. ~ BEH~ 
Genealogy of the Weakest Chi 
Daughter: Mom, can I go out? 
Mother: Sure, go enjoy yourself. 
Don't worry about me sitting here alone 
all night. 
Mother has just created a classic 
double bind, saying yes and no to her 
daughter at the same time. Most par-
ents use such paradoxical commands oc-
casionally because they are unable to re-
solve their conflicting feelings. That 
familiar behavior may seem harmless. 
But according to a branch of psychiatry 
known as family therapy, repeated dou-
ble binding is ordinarily found in fam-
ilies that produce schizophrenics. 
Unlike most psychiatrists, who be-
lieve that schizophrenia arises from age-
netic defect or a chemical imbalance, 
family therapists tend to believe that 
schizophrenia is not a disease but a des-
perate strategy adopted by a family in 
trouble. According to this view, the fam-
ily's complex web of emotional trans-
actions is like a cybernetic, or automat-
ically controlled system. Sometimes, 
when internal pressures threaten to blow 
the family apart, one member-usually 
a son or daughter-either knowingly or 
unknowingly agrees to become mentally 
ill. In a number of complex ways, this 
tactic holds the family together. But the 
child pays a big price. Says Murray Bow-
en, a clinical professor of psychiatry at 
the Georgetown University Medical 
Center: "The main building block of 
schizophrenia is the process through 
which parental immaturity is transmit-
ted to children." 
Mother's Role. Most family ther-
apists try to get at the roots of schizo-
phrenia by treating parents and grand-
parents as well as the child. But at a 
Manhattan conference of family ther-
apists (titled "Beyond the Double 
Bind"), Bowen insisted that the roots go 
farther back. In fact , he believes that it 
probably takes close to ten generations 
of parental weakness to produce a 
schizophrenic. 
In any family , according to Bowen, 
one child usually grows up to be strong-
er than the parents, most of the others 
remain about as immature as the moth-
er and father, and one child does not 
function .as well as anyone else in the 
family. Because most people select 
mates with levels of emotional maturity 
roughly equal to their own, he says, this 
"weakest child" will grow up to mate 
with a similarly impaired adult and start 
the cycle over again at a more disturbed 
level. Says Bowen: "If we follow the lin-
eage of the weakest child of the weak-
est child of the weakest child through 
multiple generations, we eventually 
emerge with a child so weak it collaps-
es into schizophrenia on emotional or 
physical separation from the parents." 
Down through the 1 
Bowen believes, each set of 
wittingly damages the we< 
But the mother's role is m 
the weak child is usually tl 
the most intense early attach 
mother. Troubled mothers • 
control their own immaturi 
the double bind in caring fc 
Example: "Stay an infant, S< 
for you. Grow up, be a succ 
early study of schizophre1 
cited the example of a mott 
I LLUSTRATI ON f'OR TIM £ I 
"No matter how worthless yo 
Marvin, you'll always be spec 
dealing with a psychotic so 
tered his bread, cut his meat . 
his milk, all the while urgin! 
learn to do more for himself. 
By the last generation, 
child can no longer function ; 
beyond cure. Says Bowen: " 
awful lot of schizophrenia tha 
product of these multiple g 
The best we're going to do in 
is to relieve the symptoms." · 
tle hope "if the goal is to take 
and make him as normal as < 
was five or six generations a 
think nature will put up with 
~~~ ~~~~:c~~ 
Mr . Justice Ste~:~ 
Mr . Justice Uarshall 
Mr . Justice 
~Ju.Jtlce 
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1st DRAFT From: Mr . Justice W~ite 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAtfESulatod = __._....s~~o<..._-____./'---71? 
Recirculat ed: ____________ _ 
No. 75-5444 
Ehrlich Anthony Coker, 
Petitioner, On \Vrit of Certiorari to the Su-
v. prcme Court of Georgia. 
State of Georgia. 
[May -, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Georgia Code Ann. § 26-2001 ( 1972) provides that "a person 
convicted of rape shall be punished by death or by imprison-
ment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than 20 years." 1 
_ I C J ~Punishment is determined by a jury in a separate sentencing 
) proceeding in which at least one of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances must be found before the death penalty may be 
imposed.2 Petitioner Coker was convicted of rape and sen-
tenced to death. Both conviction and sentence were affinned 
by the Georgia Supreme Court. Coker was granted a writ of ~ ~ 
certiorari,- U. S. - - , limited to the single claim, rejected ~LJ- _ 
by the Georgia court, that the punishment of dea.th for rape /_ ..- ~ 
violates the Eighth Amendment, which proscribes "cruel and~~_ 
unusual punishments" and which must be observed by the 
States as well as the Federal Government. Robinson v. Cal· ,,..-u...,...:A..~~""""~k.l~ 
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). ~~ I 
While serving various sentences for murder, rape, kidnap-
ping and aggravated assault, petitioner escaped from the Ware _/?LJ J-+-
~- -~ 
1 The section defines rape as ha.ving "carnal knowledge of a female, 
forcibly and against her will. Carnal knowledge in rape occurs when there fit!!-~ 
is any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ." a_ 






2 COKER v. GEORGIA 
Correctional Institution near Waycross, Ga., on September 2, 
1974. At approximately 11 p. m. that night, petitioner 
entered the house of Allen and Elnita Carver through an 
unlocked kitchen door. Threatening the couple with a 
"board," he tied up Mr. Carver in the bathroom, obtained a 
knife from the kitchen and took Mr. Carver's money and the 
keys to the family car. Brandishing the knife and saying 
"you know what's going to happen to you if you try anything, 
don't you," Coker then raped Mrs. Carver. Soon thereafter, 
petitioner drove away in the Carver car, taking Mrs. Carver. 
with him. Mr. Carver, freeing himself, notified the police; 
and not long thereafter petitioner was apprehended. Mrs. 
Carver was unharmed. 
Petitioner was charged with escape, armed robbery, motor 
vehicle theft, kidna.pping, and rape. Counsel was appointed 
to represent him. Having been found competent to stand 
trial , he was tried. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, 
rejecting his general plea of insanity. A sentencing hearing 
was then conducted in accordance with the procedures dealt 
with at length in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (19•76), 
where this Court sustained the death penalty for murder when 
imposed pursuant to the sta.tutory procedures.' The jury was 
'1 "Ga. Code Ann. § 26- 3102 (197/'i supp.) 
"Capital offenses ; jury verdict and sentence.-Where, upon n, trial 
by jnr~' , a pen;on is com·irted of an offense which ma.y be puni~ha ble by 
death , a ~entenrc of death shall not he impo~rd unless the jury includrs a 
finding of at lmst one stntutory aggravating circumst:mre and a. recom-
mendntion thnt ~urh sentence be imposed . vVherc a statutory aggrava,ting 
circum«tance is found and a recommendation of death is rnnde, th e court 
:;lwll sentence the dcfendnnt to draih. WhC'rc a sentence of death is not 
recommended by the jury, the comt shall ~rntence the dcfendnnt to irn-
pri~onment a >< provided by law. Unless the jury trying the case mnkcs 
n finding of nt lcn8t one ~tntutory ::tggravaiing circumstance and rC'com-
mends the drnth sentence in it s Yerdirt, the court shnll not senten ce the 
defendant to denth , provided thnt no ~uch finding of stntutory aggravnting 
circumst:mrcs shall be neecf'.<a ry in offenses of treason or nircraft hijnrking. 
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instructed that it could consider as aggravating circumstances 
whether the rape had been committed by a person with a prior 
record of conviction for a capital felony and whether the rape 
The provi ·ions of this section sha ll not affect a sentence when the ca~e is 
tried without. a jnry or "·hen thr jud~c accepts n plea of ~uilty. 
"Ga. Code Ann. §27-2.'30Z (1.975 supp.) 
"Recommendation to merry.-In nU capital cases, other than those of 
homicide, when the verdict is ~uilt.y, with n recommendation to merry. it 
shnll be legnl and shall be f1 recommPndution to the jud~c of im])risonmcnt 
for life. Such recommend!"Ltion shall be binding upon the jud~e. 
"Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2/i."JJ,..J (197/i supp.) 
"Mitigating and aggrm•ating circumstanres; death prnalty.-(a) the 
death pennlty mny be impo~ecl for t.hr offenses of aircrn fL hijnrkin~ or 
treMon. in nny cnse. 
"(h) In nll ense~ of other offen~es for which the dcnth pen:1ltv m:1v be 
authorizer!, thP judge ~hnll con~ider. or he ~hn ll include in his instmctions 
to the jury for it to ron~idf'r. nnv mitig:1ting rirrnml'tanre!< or nggravnting 
cirrnmstnncf'S otlwrwise nuthorizecl hv l:1w :1nrl any of the following stntu-
to[2gr:-~ .vnting circumstnnrf'~ whirh mn~· he stmported bv thr evidcncr: 
'(1) The oJTen~e of mmdrr. r:1pe. nrmrd robber~· or kidnnppin~ wns 
r mitted b~r fl rwrson wi1h n rmor rrrord of ronvirtion for fl rapitnl 
frlonv. or thP offPnse of mmdrr "·n~ committed bv n prrson who h:-ts a 
snb. tin! hi~tory of srrious nssnnltiw criminnl convictions. 
'(2) he offem:r of mnrclN. 1~e. nrmf'd rohhcr:v. or kidnnpping wns 
r 1ttrd while the ofTenclrr w:ts eng:-tgf'cl in the rommis~ion of :mother 
rnpitnl felonv. or nggrnntrd b:-tttrr~·. or the offense of mmdrr wns com-
mittrd while thr offrndrr wns engnged in thr commi<;sion of hurglnry or 
ar~on in 1 he firRt drgrf'e. 
"n) ThP ofTrnrlrr by hi" :-~rt of mmclrr. armed rohhrr~· . or kidnnpping 
knowinglv rrented a grf'ftl ri~k of df':1th to more thnn onr prrson in 11. 
puhlir nlnrr b~· menn~ of n "'rnnon or drvirc which would normall~· be 
h:1zn.rriom: to t hr lin's of morr thnn on<' prr~on. 
" ( 4) Thr offrnrlrr com mitt eel t hr offrn~c of murdrr for himself or 
n,nothrr. for 1 hr purpose of rrrriving mone~r or any of her thin~ of monr-
tnrv vnh1e. 
"(fi) The mnrdrr of :1 judicinl officer, former judirinl offirrr. di~trirt 
nttornrv or !<Oliritor or formrr district :1ttornry or 1<oliritor during or 
hrrau~r of thr rxrrri~r of his official dut~·· 
[Footnote .'] is continued on p. 41 
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had been committed in the course of committing another 
capital felony, namely. the armed robbery of Allen Carver. 
The court also instructed. pursuant to statute, that even if 
"(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or 
c~'ttrd murder a~ an n~rnt ~nployee of another per. on. 
'(7) he offense of murdrr,~nrmecl robbery or kidnnpping was I 
o~ou~ly or w:mt~1ly j!_r, h~e or ~an in thnt it inYolvecltor-
ture, depravity of mind, or an a~gravntrd battery to the Yictim. 
"(8) The offense of mmdcr wns comrnittrd against nn~r prace ofTicrr, 
corrections emJlloyre or fireman while rngaged in the performance of his 
official dutirs. 
"(9) The ofTrme of murder was eommittrd by a prrson i11, or who has 
esr:~ped from, thr lnwful cu~tod~r of a peace officer or place of lawful 
confinement. 
"(10) The mmder was commit ted for the purpose of avoiding, int rr-
ferin~ with, or prcYenting a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful 
confinemrnt, of himself or another. 
" (c) Thf' ~tat ut ory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be 
wa.rra.nted by the evidenc·c . hall be given in charge and in writing to the 
jury for itR flf'libf'ration. 
"The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate-
in writing, si~nf'd b~r the forrman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance 
or circum~tancr~ which it found beyond a rensonable doubt. In non-jury 
ca~c~ the judge ~hall make such designation. Except in ca:-;rs of treason or 
aircrnft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances enumerated in Code Section 27-2534.1 (b) is so found. the· 
death pennlty shall not be imposed. 
"Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2537 (197/5 supp.) 
"Review of death sentences.-(a) Whenever the death penalty is im-
posed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the· 
selltence shall be reviewed on the record by the Suprrme Court of 
Georgia. The clerk of the trial court, within ten days after receiving the 
tmnscript, shall transmit the entire record and transcript to the Supreme 
Court of Georgin, together with a notice prepared by the clerk and a 
report prepared by the tria.! judge. The notice shall set forth the title 
a.nd docket number of the casr, the name of the defendant and the nnme 
and address of his attorney, a narrative statement of the judgmrnt, the 
offen~e, and the punishment prescribed. The report shall be in thr form 
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a!!:gravatin circumstances were present. the death penalty 
nee not be imposed if the jury found mitigating circum-
stanceR to predominate, that is, circumstances)'constituting 
of a. standard que:<tionnaire prepared and supplird hy the Suprrmc Court 
of Georgia. 
"(h) The Suprrme Court of Grorgin shall consider the punishment ns 
well ns nny errors rnumeratrd by w:1y or appeal. 
"(r) With rrgard to thr ~rntrncr, thr court shall determinr: 
"(1) Whether the srntenrr of drnth was imposed under the innuence 
of pnssion, prrjudice, or any othrr n.rhitrnry factor, nnd 
"(2) Whethrr, in cn..-es othrr than treason or nircra.ft hijacking, the 
evidrnre supp01is the jur.1·'s or judge's finding of a Rtatutory aggranding 
rircum~t~nre ns enumerntrd in Codr srrtion 27-2534.1 (h). n.nd 
"(r) Whether the srntenre of death is exre,;~ive or disproportionntr to 
the pmalty imposrd in ~imilar cnsrs, ronRidering both the crimr nnd the 
drfend:mt. 
"(cl) Both the dcfrncbnt nnd the Stn.te shall ha.ve the right to submit 
brief::: within the time pro,·idccl by the court, :tnd to present. ornl argument 
to the court. 
" (c) The court shall inrludr in it~ derision a reference to t ho~e similar 
rnRcs which it took into considrration. In nddition to iti; authority regard-
inp; ron"<'ction of rrrors, the romt, with rrgnrd to review or death srntrnces, 
shall be ::mthorized to: 
"(1) Affirm the srntenrc of drath; or 
"(2) Set the sentence aside :md rrmand the case for resrntrncing by 
t hr trial judge based on i hr record :mel argument. of conn sri. The records 
or those similar cases rcfrrred to by the Supreme Court. of Gr01·gin in its 
drrision, and the extmcts prepared as hereinafter providrd for, shall be 
provided to the resentrncing judge for his consideration. 
"(f) There shall be an ARii~tant to the Supreme Court, IYho shall be an 
nttornry appointed by the Chief .Justice of Georgia and who >:hall 
Rerve at the pleasure of the court. The court shnll accumulate the rrcords 
of all capital felony cases in which sentence was imposed after Jnmwry 1, 
1970, or such earlier date as the court mny deem approprinte. The As-
sistnnt shall provide thr court with whatever e:\.'tractrd information it 
desires with respect thereto, including bnt not limited to a synopsis or 
brief of the facts in the record concerning tho crime and the defendant. 
"(g) The court shall be authorized to employ an approprinte staff and 
such methoc!H to compile such dnta as arc deemed by the Chief Justice to 
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.i ustification or excuse for the offense in question, "but which, 
in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or 
reducing the degree" of moral culpability or punishment. 
R. 300. The jury's verdict on the rape count was death by 
electrocution. Both aggravating circumstances on which the lA 
court instructed were found to be present by the jury. V\ 
'"-----"- II 
Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and the Court's 
decisions last Term in Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Proffitt v. 
Flo1-ida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976); 
and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976), make unnec-
essary the recanvassing of certain critical aspects of the 
controversy about the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment. It is now settled that the death penalty is not invari-
a cruel .nd unusual punishment within the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendmen ; 1t is not inherently barbaric or an 
unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; n-;ither is it 
ah~v.§. d~~pro12.2rtionate to the crime for which it is imposed. 
It is also established that imposing capital punishment, at 
least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided 
under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the infirmi-
ties vvhich led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital 
punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia., supm. 
In sustaining the imposition of the death penalty in Gregg, 
however, the Court firmly embraced the holdings and dicta 
be nmn·opriate nnd rcle\'ant to the statutory que::;tions concerning the 
validi ty of the sentence. 
"(h) The office of the A::;::;i~tant shall be attached to the office of the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court of Georgia for administrative purposCf'. 
"(i) The sentence review shall he in nddition to dirert :tppeal, if taken, 
and the re\·iew and nppeal shall be ronsolidatrd for consideration. The 
court shall render its derision on legal rrrors enumerated, the factual 
Hubstantiation of the verdict , and the validity of the sentence." 
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from prior cases, Furman v. Georgia, supra; Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U. S. 661 (1962); Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 
(1958); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (19'10), to 
the effect that the Eighth Amendment bars not only those 
punishments that arc "ba.rbaric" but also those that are 
"exc~i~e" in relation to the crime. commi~d. u naer Gregg, ~ 
a punishment is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it 1 
(1) makes no measurable ontribution to acceptable goals of 
punishment and wncc is nothing more than the purposeless 
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly 
~ J:~.2Pffitl9 n to the severity of the crime. A punishment 
might fail t e test on either ground. Furthermore, these 
Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or a.ppear to be, 
merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment 
should be informed by objective factors to the maximum 
possible extent. To this end, attention must be given to the 
p~ic a,tli.~es conceu1ing a particular senwnce-history a.nd 
precedent, legislative attitudes and the response of juries 
reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted. In 
Gregg, after giving due regard to such sources, the Court's 
judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate murder 
was neither the purposrlcss imposition of severe punishment 
nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But 
there was reserved the question of the constitutiona.lity of the 
death penalty when imposed for other crimes. 428 U. S., at 
187 n. 35. 
IIT 
Tha.t question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is 
now before us. We have concluded that a sentence of death 
is ~·ossly dis12roportionate punishment for the crime of rape, 
is excessive and is t iierefore'"Torbidaen by the Eighth Amend-
ment as cruel and unusual punishment.4 
4 Because the death sentenre i~ a dit>proportiona.tc puni~lunent for rape, 
it is cruel and unusw1l punit>hmcnt within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment eYen though it mny mensumbly serve the legitimate ends 
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A 
As advised by reccn t cases. we seck O'Uidance in history and 
from the objective evidence of the cou~try"S p~sent judgment 
concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of 
an adult woman. At no time in the last 50 years has a 
majority of the States authorized. death as a punishment for 
rape. In 1926, 18 States. tlw District of Columbia. and the 
Federal Government authorized capital punishment for the 
rape of an adult female. 5 That number had declined, but not 
substantially. by 1971 just prior to the decision in Furman v. 
Georgia-16 States )}us thr Federal Government.° Furman 
then invalidated most of the capita pums ment statutes in 
this country, including the rape statutes, because. among other 
reasons. of the manner in which the death penalty was 
imposed and utilized under those laws. 
With their death penalty statutes for the most part inva.li-
dated. the States were faced with the choice of enacting 
modified ca.pital punishment laws in an attPmpt to satisfy the 
requirements of Furman or of being satisfied with life impris-
onment as the ultimate punishment for any offense. Thirty-
of punishmrnt and therrfore is not invalid for its failme to do so. We 
observe that in the light of thr legislative decisions in almo~t all of the 
Sta.tcs and in most of the counlrit>s around the world, itf'?would be difficul'll 
to snpport a claim thnt the death pennliy for rape is an indi~pensable p:-~rt 
of the States' criminal justice system. 
5 Bye, Recent History and Pre~ent Stntus of Capital Punishment in the 
United States, 17 .Tomnal of Criminal La,w 234, 241-242 (1926). 
0 Aln. Code, Tit. 14, § 395 (1958 rrcornp. val.); Ark. StnJ. Ann. § 41-
4303 (1964); Fin. Stat. Ann. § 794.01 (1965); Ga. Code Ann. § 2G-2001 
(1970 rev. val.); Ky. Rev. Stat .. Ann. §§ 435.080-435.090 (1963); Ln. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 14:42 (1950); Mel. Code Ann. § 27-461 (1957); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 2358 (1956 recornp. val.); Vernon's Mo. Stat. Aim. § 559 .. 260 
(1953); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363 (1967) (mpe with ·ub lan1.ial bodily 
harm); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-21 (1953); Okla,. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21, 
§ 1115 (1958); S. C. Code Ann. §§ 1G-72, 16-80 (1962); Tenn. Code Anll. 
§ 39-3702 (1955); Vernon's Tex. Penni Code Ann. § 1189 (1961); Va.. 
Code Ann. § 18.144 (1960 rep!. vol.); 18 U. S. C. A. § 2031 (1970). 
' . 
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five States immediately reinstituted the death penalty for a.t 
least limited kinds of crime. Gregg v. Georgia. S'Upra, at 179 
n. 23. This public judgment as to the acceptability of capital 
punishment, evidenced by the immediate, post-Furman legis-
lative reaction in a large majority of the State's. heavily 
influenced the Court to sustain the death penalty for murder 
in Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U. S .. at 179-182. 
But if the "most 1narkecl indication of a society's endorse-
ment of the death penalty for murder is the legislative 
I
J·esponse to Furman," Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 179. it should 
also be a 1elling datum that the pnblic judgment with respect 
to rape, as reflected i11 t he statutes providing the punishrnent 
for that crime, ha.s been dramatically different. In reviving 
death penalty laws to satisry llurman's ma.ndate. none of the 
States that had not previously authorized death for rape chose 
to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in I 
which rape had been a capital offeuse. onl~ three provided the 
death pena.lty for rape of an adult woman in their revised 
statutes-Georgia., North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the 
latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those 
found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson 
and Roberts. When Louisiana, responding to the latter deci-
sions. again revised its capital punishment laws, rape was not 
among the crimes for which it sought to retain the death 
penalty. None of the six other States that have amended or 
replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976/ 
including four States (in addition to Louisia.na) thn.t had 
authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had 
reacted to FU1·man with ma.ndatory statutes. included ra.pe 
7 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws, r. 1, p. 627 (Fir~t Extraord. Se~,;.) (July 23, 
1976); La. Acts 1976, No. 316 (Aug. 1, 1976), La. Acts 1976, No. 694 (Aug. 
2, 1976); 1976 Ky. Acts, r. 15 (Extraord. SoPs.) (Dec. 22, 1976); 1977 
Wyo. Sess. Laws, c. 122 (Feb. 28, 1977). Very rec@t legislative action 
has al~o taken phce in Virginia, Maryland, and New Jen;;ey. In Vir-
ginia, the Governor has signed tlw legislation into law; but in l\1aryland 
and New Jersey, gubernatorial action has not, yet been completed. 
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among the cnmes for which death was an authorized 
punishment. 
Georgia argues tha.t 11 of the 16 States that authorized 
death for rape in 1972 attempted to comply with Furman by 
enacting arguably mandatory dea.th penalty legislation and 
that it is very likely that aside from Louisiana and North 
Carolina, these States simply chose to eliminate rape as a 
capital offense rather than to require death for each and every 
instance of ra.pe.8 The argument is not without force; but 
five of the 16 States did not talm the mandatory course and 
also did not continue rape as a capital offense. Further, as 
we have indicated, Louisiana and the legislatures of four other 
of the 11 arguably mandatory States have revised their death 
penalty laws since Woodson and Roberts; rape is not among 
the capital offenses contained in these new laws. And this is 
to sa.y nothing of the 19 other States that enacted nonmanda-
tory, post-Furman statutes and chose not to sentence rapists 
to death. 
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee 
also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only 
where the victim was a child and th;; rapist an '";,dult.9 The 
Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death 
sentence was ma.ndatory. Collins v. State, - U. S. -
(1977). The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in 
the United States at the present time that authorizes a 
8 The 11 States which rcRpondcnt plarc~ in this ratlf'gory arc as follows: 
"Ky. Tie,·. Stat.§ 507.020 (1975); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30 (1974); 
l\'Id. Code Ann., Art. 27 § 413 (Supp. 1976); Mi,~. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-19,. 
97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Vernon's Mo. Stnt. Ann. 
§§ 559.005, 559.009 (Supp. 1976); Nev. Re,·. Stat. § 200.030 (1975 Rev.); 
N. C. Gen. Stat.§§ 14-17, 14-21 (Cum. Snpp. 1975); 21 Okla. S1at. Ann. 
§§ 701.1-701.3 (Supp. 1975); S.C. Code Ann.§ 16-52 (Supp. 1975); Tenn. 
Code Ann. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406, :39-3702 (1975); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-
10, 18.2-31 (1975 Rev.)." 
g Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.011 (2) (1976-1976 Supp.); Mis;;. Code Ann .. 
§ 97-3-65 (1974); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3702 (1974). 
) 
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sentence of dea.th when the ra.pe victim is an adult woman, 
and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment 
when the victim is a child. 
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for 
rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it 
obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital 
punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.10 
B 
It was also observed in Gregg that "t~ . . . is a sig-
nificant and reliable index of contemporary values because it 
is so directly involved," Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 181, and 
that it is thus important to look to the sentencing decisions 
that juries have made in the course of assessing whether 
capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the crime 
being tried. Of course, the jury's judgment is mearful on ly 
where the jury has an appropriate measure of choice as to 
whether the death penalty is to be imposed. As far as execu-
tion for rape is concerned, this is now true only in Georgia 
and in Florida; and in the latter State, capital punishment is 
authorized only for the rape of children. 
According to the factual submissions in this Court, out of 
all rape convictions in Georgia since 1973-and tha.t total 
number has not been tendered-63 cases had been reviewed 
by the Georgia. Supreme Court as of the time of oral a.rgu-
ment; and of these. six involved a death sentence, one of 
which was set aside, leaving five convicted rru2ists now under 
s~!~. -£!~!!:!:.b...i~! State or'Georgia. Georgia juries have 
..__. "' 
10 In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102 ( 1958), the Comt took p~ins to 
note the clim~te of international opinion concrrning tho arcept~bility of 
a particular punishment. It is thus not irrclev~nt here tha.t out of 60 
major nations in the world snn·eyed in 1965, only three rrtninrd the 
de~.t.h penalty for rupe whrrr drn.th did not ensue. United Nntions, 
Departmrnt of Economic nne! SoC'ial AfTairs, Capital Pnni~hment (1968) 
40, 86. 
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thus sentenced rapists to death six times since 1973. This 
obviously is gQt a negligible number; and the State argues 
that as a practical mattcr juries simply reserve the extreme 
sanction for extreme cases of rape and that recent experience 
surely does not prove that jurors consider tho death penalty 
to be a disproportionate punishment for every conceivable 
instance of rape. no matter how aggravated. Nevertheless, it 
is true that in the vast majority of cases, at least nine out of 
10, juries have not imposed the death sentence. 
IV 
These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legisla-
tures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this 
controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end 
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of 
the .. acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment. Nevertheless, the legislative rejection of ca.p.ital 
punishment for rape strongly confirms our. own judgment, ~ 
I which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for 1 ~cnmc ofrap'l'ng an adult woi;;an. .. " '" .//;!' e do not discount the seriousness of ra.pe as a crime. It 
«shighl"ll:..feprehensible, both in a moral sense a.nd in its almost 
to, a17o";1tempTior the personal integrity and autonomy of the 
female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those 
with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short -olhomicick;, it is the "ultimate yiola_tion of self." 11 It is also 
a violent crime because it normally involves force, or tho 
threat of force or intimidation. to overcome the will and the 
capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accom-
panied by physi~a!, injur! to th,; fem,&e and can !2~t 
11 Law Enforcement Assi~tance Administration Report, Rape and Its 
Victims: A Report for Citizens, Health Facilities and Criminal Ju~ticc 
Agencies 1 (1975), quoting Bard & Elli ·on, Crisis, Intervention and In-
vestigation of Forcible Rape, The Police Chief, May 1974, Heproduccd as 
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melJ..lial d~e. 1 ~ Because it undermines th ~ commun'ty's 
s= of secunty, there is public injury as well. ~ tC_. 
Rape is without doubt deserving.of serious punishment, but 
in terms of moral rlea avity and of the injury to the person 
and to the public, it aoes not compare with murde~ which 
............... I , 
docs involve the unjustified takii1g oT human life. Although 
it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition 
docs not in e he death or even the serious injury to 
another 12-erson.1 ~ The murc erer dl s; t 1e rapist, if no more 
than th;t, does not. Life is over for the victim of the mur-
derers; for the rape victim, life may not be ncady so happy as 
it was, but it is not over and ~1·ormall] is not beyond repair. 
We have the abiding conviction that the dcaili penalty, wh1ch 
"is unique in its severity and revocability," 428 U. S. 187, is 
an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take 
human life. 
( 
This doe~..§nd the _1nattcr; for under G~orgia law. death 
may not be imposed for a'hy capital offense, incTUding rape, 
unless the ·ur, or judge finds one of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances and then e ec R o nnpose a sen ence. ec-
tiOl~ (supp.) 1975; Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 165~ 
166. For the rapist to be executed in Georgia. it must 
therefore be found not only that he committed rape but also 
that one or more of the following aggravating circumstances 
were present: (1) tha.t the rape was committed by a person 
with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony; (2) that 
the rape was committed while the offender was engaged in the 
commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery; 
I or (3) the rape "was g_utrageous or wantonly vjle, horrible or inhuman in that itm voTveCI torture, depravity of mind or 
1 ~ See Note, The Victim In a Forcible Rape Case : a Feminist Yir\\' , 11 
American Criminal Law Review 335, 338 (1972); Comment, Rnpc and 
Rape Laws : Sexism in Society and the Law, 61 Cnlif. L. Re\' . 9HJ , 922-923 
(197:3) . 
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aggravated battery to the victim." 14 Here, the :first two of 
these aggravating circumstances were alleged and found by the 
JUry. 
Neither of these circumstances, nor both of them together, 
change our conclusion that the death sentence imposed on 
Coker is a disproportionate punishment for rape. Coker had 
prior convictions for capital felonies-rape, murder and kid-
napping-but obviously none of them had been deemed by 
the sentencing jury to warrant the death penalty; a.nd these 
prior convictions do not change the fact that the instant crime 
being punished is a rape not involving the taking of life. 
It is also true that the present rape occurred while Coker 
was committing armed robbery, a felony for which the Georgia 
statutes authorize the death penalty.'5 But Coker was tried 
for the robbery offense as well as for rape and received a 
separate life sentence for this crime; the jury did not deem 
the robbery itself deserving of the death penalty, even though 
accompanied by the aggravating circumstance, which was· 
stipulated, that Coker had been convicted of a prior capital 
crime.'~ 
14 Thrre :He othrr aggrnvnting rircumstnnces provided in thr statute , src 
n. 3. su7'ra., but. they nrr not npplirnble to rape. 
'"In Grega v. Gem·gia, thr Georgin Suprrmr Court rcfnsrd to Rust n in 
a drnth srntencr for :umrd robhrrv berausr, for onr renRon, drnth hnd 
bern so srldom imposrd for this crime in othrr rasrs that f'urh a sentrnre 
was exre:sive :-~nd could not hr sustninrd under the st:-~tutr. As it did in 
thi~ ra,e, however, the Georgia Supreme Court app:-~rently continues to 
recognize armed rohbrry ns a capital ofTrn. r for the purpo"r of appb•ing 
thr aggravating cirrnmstnncrs provif'iom; of the Grorgia Code. 
tn Vlhrre the aecompnnying capitnl crime is mnrdcr. it is most likrly thnt. 
the defcnd:-~nt. would be trird for murder, rather than rape; and it j,; 
prrhnps :w:-~drmic to drnl with thr drath sentrnce for rapr in snch a 
circumstnnrr. It. is likrwisr unnrcrss:1r~· to con,:idrr the rapr-frlony 
murdcr-n rnpe accompanird h~· thr drath of thr victim whirh wn~ lm-
lnwfnlly but nonmaliriousl~r rnusrd by the drfrnclant. 
Whrre the third aggrnv:-~ting rircumstancr mentionrd in the trxt i~ 
present-that the rape is pnrticulnrly vilr or involves torture or aggmvutcd 
~ ----- -- ._..... ~ 
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We note finally that in Georgia a person commits murder 
when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either 
express or implied, causes the death of another human being. 
He also commits that crime when in the commission of a 
felony he causes the death of another human being, irre-
spective of malice. But even where the killing is deliberate, 
it is not punishable by death absent proof of aggravating 
t circumstances. It is difficult to accept the notion, and we do I i!. ~' with or without aggravating circumstances, 
should be punished more heavily than the deliberate killer as /{ t::J 
long as tho rapist docs not himself take the life of his victim. 
The judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court is reversed and 
tho case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
baiLery-it would seem that the defendant could very likely be com·icted, 
tried and appropriately punished for this additional conduct. --- - -- -
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No. 75-5444 Coker v. State of Georgia 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring and dissenting. 
Although I concur in the judgment of the Court 
on the facts of this case, and in much of its reasoning, I 
dissent from the holding that regardless of the circum-
stances capital punishment always is disproportionate 
punishment - and thus unconstitutional punishment - for the 
cri~e of raping an adult woman.J7At the outset, I note that 
w-d.L 
the Court's opinion ranges ~ beyond what is necessary to 
decide this case. The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), specifies aggravating 
circumstances that may be considered by the jury when 
appropriate. With respect to the crime of rape, only 
three such circumstances are specified: ~ (i) the offense ~ 
1\ 
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction 
for a capital felony: (ii) the offense was committed while 
the offender was engaged in another capital felony or in 
aggravated battery: and (iii) the offense was "outrageously 
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
!>; , 
torture, depr~v1ty of mind, or an aggravated battery to the 
victim". Ante, at 3. 
Only the latter describes in general the 
q-~ 
offense of aggravated rape, identifed rmaer tbe lau of ... 
A 
~y~aees as a separate and more heinous offense than 
rape. 
~ 
1Petitioner Coker, apparently • vi-cious afl'd incor-
1\ 
rigible {criminal, ante at 1, escaped from prison on 
September 2, 1974, and on the same evening raped his 
victim at knife's point in the presence of her bound and 
gagged husband. As vicious as this crime was, it was 
not aggravated rape in the sense in which that crime 
~~~istinguished from ordinary rape. The jury 
was not instructed to consider the third of Georgia's 
aggravating circumstances presumably because the evidence 
2. 
did not indicate that the rape itself was "outrageously or 
t/1-~ , • , ~ ~_,.,~ • .,.~14 
wanto~ly ~i~e, hor~ible or inhuma:_"" J Tnus, if the._ term ~. 
"~ary" may 
"-., 
be used in connection with an offense so 
/ 
/ repugnan~ concepts of decency, the law generally 
" 
·I' 
recognizes a distinction between rape that is ordinary i 
the sense that the act itsel js free from extreme sexua 
/ ' depravity he victim is unli~ly to suffer 
/ 
permanent physical or mental injury. I use n 
, ; ;)ZIJ , ) 3. 
Thus, the case presented for our 
decision is not one of aggravated rape as defined 
by the relevant provision of the Georgia 
statute. It therefore was unnecessary for the 
Court to write in terms so sweeping as apparently 
to foreclose each of the fifty state legislatures 
from creating a substantive crime o aggravated 
~[ ~> rape punishable by death. n The Court~ in 
accord with our decisions last Term, that: 
II .. the death penalty is not 
invariably cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment; it is 
not inherently barbaric or an 
unacceptable mode of punishment 
for crime; neither is it always 
disproportionate to the crime 
for which it is imposed." Ante at 5. 
4 . 
The Court then concludes that a "se'ntence of death is 
grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, is exces-
sive and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment". 
Ante at 7. If this conclusion were limited to the case 
before us or to the crime of rape free from the type of 
aggravating circumstances mentioned below, I would be in 
entire accord with the judgment of disproportionality. 
Rapes, however, are not fungible. As noted in 
Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626, 627 (CA 4 1966), "there 
is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of 
rapists". A high percentage of rapes involve no aggravated 
f/2.--/ 
circumstances either in the manner in which the crime '"'"W'Cls , 
1\ 
committed or in the effect upon the victim. The range, 
both of culpability and effect upon the victim, may well 
be broader in the crime of rape than with respect to any 
other common law crime. Thus, in what might be called the 
usual rape case I agree that capital punishment is grossly 
excessive and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment. 
5. 
But all rapes cannot be characterized as "usual". 
Some are the most __ atrocious intrusions upon th~ personal 
privacy and dignity of the victim known to the law. And 
some result in the most serious consequences. The Court 
itself acknowledges that rape is one of the ugliest of 
crimes: 
"It is highly rep~ehensible, 
both in a moral sense and in 
its total contempt for the 
personal integrity and~1:'-~ 
~c-<;t~ 
autonomy of the female victim 
and for the latter's privilege 
~ 
of choosing' those with whom 
intimate relationships ought to 
be established. Short of homi-
cide, it is the 'ultimate 
violation of self'". Ante at 12. 





committed\ rarely can it be said to be 
unpremeditated~ften the victim suffers serious 
physical injury~ and the psychological 
consequences may be more serious even than per-
.i~ ­
/~ 
manent bodily harm. Yet, despite all that can y 
and indeed acknowledged by the Court ~ as 
1--k ~ 
to ~ sordid, heinous nature of a particular 
and the physical and psychological injuries 
result, the Court draws a ~right line be-
' 
and murder. It / s said, 
one may say, t at life is "over 
victim, life may n 
was, but it is 
"is not over" for 
I 
- a history of ,/ his 
I 
I 
life loses i s meaning 
I 
murd rers~ for the rape 
so happy as it 
" . . To be sure, life 
rape victim, but 
documents -
injured physically r psychologically 
rape victims, often the 
consequences were worse than death. Nevertheless, 
LFP/lab 5/12/77 Rider A, pg. 6a Coker 
Yet, despite the almost infinite 
~ 
in the ~wti(ch this offense can be committed and 
A • 
~ 
in its effect upon the victim, the CourtAtreats all 
rapes alike. The Court then draws a bright line · 
J- f t.A.--~--­
between ~ rapes and murder) ~ife is "over for the 
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may 
not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over 
and normally is not beyond repair." ~ In 
its next sentence, the Court expresses an "abiding 
conviction that the death penalty • is an excessive 
penalty for the rapist. . II Ante at 13. This con-
~ 
viction apparently includes the victim whose life is 
"beyond repair", a view that ~. I cannot uze;;a 
The history of this crime abundantly documents 
that life may indeed lose its meaning for the victim so 
grievously injured physically or~ychologically as never 
again to live normally. There have been surviving rape 
victims for whom the consequences are worse than death. 
It cannot be said as to every rape case that the victim's 
"life ••• is not beyond repair." 
7. 
in making its judgment of disproportionality, the 
Court views all rapes as being identical. So 
long as one survives a rape, capital punishment 
for the crime would e excessive wholly without 
regard to the circumstances or the shattered 
'1'~~ 







{)-- of the 
?F . ~tV// 
may be greater than~ the 
~~ 
murderer. The l~ crime often is committed 
" 
(as in felony murder for example) with far less 
~~~~ 
delilser«ti:c::R=aa=edd;;).:Rtta~ j a-ing ,.i_,,......,t th.a,n ~~~ t!:JHte 
~~~ ~~~---------....... 
~Amany rapes.- the difference between 
attempted murder is a fortuitous 
accident without 
entirely on whether the 
survives. See Ralph v. Warden, Maryland 
Penitentiary, 438 F.2d 786, 794 (Haynesworth, con 
curring) · -------------------------------------
8. 
In su mary, where the cr1me - as 
recognizes is "short of homicide ••• the 
'ult'mate violation of self'", ante at 12, we 
<17 2--~~ ~~ 
~should not deny to the legislative branch of . 
government the right to identify the elements of 
I ~ ~~ /:11• • ~ .&p' ¢;£::t:Z(:; "1 
aggravation that may justify capital punishment~~ , 
A · ·- ~ I ~~ ' 
~ ~,//~~ 
~need not undertake a eetail€~ formulation of 
A I\ 
the relevant criteria. Georgia describes them as 
when the offense is committed "outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it 
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim." The Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Ralph v. warden, 
438 F.2d 786 (1970), held that the death penalty 
was an appropriate punishment for rape only where 
the life of the victim was "in danger". Chief 
Judge Haynesworth, who joined in the panel's 
opinion, thought that this test was appropFiate 
~~/~~tie ks~ I b.+-
~ in that case. ~capital punishment 
~ 
wears-be excessive and violative of the Eighth 
1'\ 
Amendment unless the victim in fact suffered 
9. 
"grievous physical or psychological harm". Id., 
Cfk~ 
at 794. AI would eschew attempting any 
formulation of a disproportionality test, as this 
properly is a legislative function. I do think 
the test should embrace consideration of the 
factors discussed above: the culpability of the 
offender, the circumstances and manner in which 
the offense was committed, and the consequences 
suffered by the victim. Where a state statute 
prescribes appropriately the elements of the 
offense of aggravated rape, and provides the 
in Gregg, I would find no basis for holding that 
~ c~~ec:1 
death is a disproportionate penalty fo~ ' 
(\. /1 1 11 -
~~ ~/U~~~~ •. 
~most ao:rgig =ef Ml erimSla&.. The death penalty ~ 
1\. 
would be reserved only for the rare case of a 
~ 
rape so outrageous and~serious in its consequences 




MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring and dissenting. 
Although I concur in the judgment of the Court 
on the facts of this case, and in much of its reasoning, I 
dissent from the holding that regardless of the circum-
stances capital punishment always is disproportionate 
punishment - and thus unconstitutional punishment - for the 
crime of raping an adult woman. 
At the outset, I note that the Court's 
opinion ranges well beyond that is necessary to decide 
this case. The Georgia statute, sustained in QFegg v. 
georgia, 428 u.s. 153 (1976), specifies aggravating 
circumstances that may be considered by the jury when 
appropriate. With respect to the crime of rape, only 
three such circumstances are specified: (i) the offense 
was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction 
for a capital felony; (ii) the offense was committed while 
the offender was engaged in another capital felony or in 
aggravated battery~ and (iii) the offense was "outrageously 
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the 
victim". Ante, at 3. 
2. 
Only the latter describes in general the 
offense of aggravated ~ape, often identifed as a 
separate and more heinous offense than rape. 
Petitioner Coker, apparently an incorrigible 
criminal, ante at 1, escaped from prison on 
September 2, 1974, and on the same evening raped his 
victim at knife's point in the presence of her bound and 
gagged husband. As vicious as this crime was, it was 
not aggravated rape in the sense in which that crime 
may be distjnguished from ordinary rape. The jury 
was not instructed to consider the third of Georgia's 
aggravating circumstances presumably because the evidence 
did not indicate that the rape itself was "outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman", or that there was an 
aggravated battery. 
Thus, the case presented for our decision is 
not one of aggravated rape as defined by the relevant 
provision of the Georgia statute. It therefore was 
unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so sweeping as 
apparently to foreclose each of the fifty state 
legislatures from creating a substantive crime of 
3. 
aggravated rape punishable by death. 
The Court holds, in accord with our decisions 
last Term, that: 
" ••• the death penalty is not 
invariably cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment; it is not 
inherently barbaric or an unaccept-
able mode of punishment for crime; 
neither is it always disporportionate 
to the crime for which it is imposed." 
Ante at 5. 
The Court then concludes that a "sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, is ex-
cessive and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amend-
ment". Ante at 7. If this conclusion were limited to 
the case before us or to the crime of rape free from the 
type of aggravating circumstances mentioned below, I would 
be in entire accord with the judgment of 
disproportionality. 
Rapes, however, are not fungible. As noted in 
4. 
Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626, 627 (CA 4 1966), "there is 
extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists". 
A high percentage of rapes involve no aggravated circum-
stances either in the manner in which the crime is 
committed or in the effect upon the victim. The range, 
both of culpability and effect upon the victim, may well be 
broader in the crime of rape than with respect to any other 
common law crime. Thus, in what might be called the usual 
rape case I agree that capital punishment is grossly 
execessive and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment. 
But all rapes cannot be characterized as 
"usual". Some are the most atrocious intrusions upon the 
personal privacy and dignity of the victim known to the 
law. And some result in the most serious consequences. 
The Court itself acknowledge that rape is one of the 
ugliest of crimes: 
"It is highly reprehensible, both 
in a moral sense and in its total 
contempt for the personal integrity and 
autonomy of the female victim and for 
the latter's privilege of choosing 
5. 
start those with whom i~timate 
relationships ought to be estab-
lished. Short of homicide, it is 
the 'ultimate violation of self'". 
Ante at 12. 
In addition, rape is never a crime committed accidentally; 
rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated; often the 
victim suffers serious physical injury; and the psychological 
consequences may be more serious even than permanent 
bodily harm. 
Yet, despite the almost infinite variation 
in the degree of brutality in which this offense can 
be committed and in its effect upon the victim, the 
Court simply treats all rapes alike. The Court then 
draws a bright line between rapes and murder. It is 
said life is "over for the victim of the murderer; for 
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it 
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond 
repair." In its next sentence, the Court expresses an 
"abiding conviction that the death penalty ••• is an 
excessive penalty for the rapist •• " . . Ante at 13. 
This conviction apparently includes the victim whose 
6. 
life is "beyond repair " , a view that. I cannot 
accept. 
The history of this crime abundantly 
documents that life may indeed lose its meaning for the 
victim so grievously injured physically or psychologically 
as never again to live normally. There have been 
surviving rape victims for whom the consequences are 
worse than death. It cannot be said as to every rape 
case that the victim's "life •.• is not beyond repair." 
The Court ignores the degree of culpability 
of the assailant as well as the effect upon the victim. 
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater 
than that of the murderer. The crime of murder often 
is committed (as in felony murder for example) with 
far less premeditation and less deliberately demeaning 
of the victim than in many rapes. 
In my view, this Court should not deny 
to the legislative branch of government the right to 
identify the elements of aggravation that may justify 
capital punishment for rape. One need not undertake 
in this case formulation of the relevant criteria. 
Georgia describes them as when the offense is committed 
"outrageously or wantoriy vile, horrible or inhuman in 
7. 




aggravated battery to the victim." The Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Ralph v. Warden, 
438 F.2d 786 (1970), held that the death penalty was 
an appropriate punishment for rape only where the life 
of the victim was "in danger". Chief Judge Haynesworth, 
who joined in the panel's opinion, thought that this 
test was appropriate in that case. In general, he 
views capital punishment as excessive and violative of 
the Eighth Amendment unless the victim in fact suffered 
"greivous physical or psychological harm". Id., at 794. 
But I would eschew attempting any formu-
lation of a disproportionality test, as this properly 
is a legislative function. I do think the test should 
embrace consideration of the factors discussed above: 
the culpability of the offender, the circumstances and 
manner in which the offense was committed, and the 
consequences suffered by the victim. \ihere a state 
statute prescribes appropriately the elements of the 
offense of aggravated rape, and provides the other 
safeguards that we identified in Gregg, I would find 
no basis for holding that death always is a dispropor-
tionate penalty for this crime--most sordid of all 
crimes. The death penalty thus would be reserved only 
B. 
for the rare case of a rape so outra~eous and so 
serious in its consequences as to justify society's 
\ 
ultimate penalty. 
LFP/tap 5/13/77 Rider B Coker 
The Court's opinion permits, as a penalty for the 
crime of rape , the imposition of life imprisonment without 
parole. If one serving such a sentence escapes and commits 
a second rape (as Coker did in this case) no additional 
punishment of any consequence could be imposed. Despite 
the absence of conclusive evidence, we recognized in Greg 
and related cases that deterrence may be a l egitimate motive 
for the imposition of capital punishment. Today's decision 
deprives society of the power to create any effective deter-
renee of rape by escaped life termers. 
Rider C 
Furmand v. Georgia 408 u.s. 238, 456-461 (1972) (Powe,l l, 
J., dissenting). 
LFP/tap 5/13/77 Rider A Coker 
The Court suggests that if a rape is sufficiently 
brutal the offender may be tried for battery as well as 
rape. This may be an option that a state legislature would 
adopt. But I perceive no reason for this Court to fore-
close a different legislative choice. Traditionally, 
aggravated rape has been a different and more heinous 
. than cr1me;rape. See model penal code, tentative draft number 
four, c §207.4, p. 246 (1955). The fractionalizing of a 
crime of aggravated rape, as a justification for more 
lenient treatment of the offender, certainly is not 
justified by the constitution. 
LFP/lab 5/13/77 
DRAFT 
No. 75-5444 Coker 
dissenting. 
Although I concur in 
the facts of this case, and ~A mwg~ of its I 
~ dissent from the holding that regardless of the circum-
stances capital punishment always is disproportionate 
punishment - and thus unconstitutional punishment - for the 
crime of raping an adult woman. 
At the outset, I note that the Court's 
opinion ranges well beyond
1
1 hat is necessary to decide 
this case. The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), specifies aggravating 
circumstances that may be considered by the jury when 
appropriate. With respect to the crime of rape, only 
three such circumstances are specified: (i) the offense 
was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction 
for a capital felony; (ii) the offense was committed while 
the offender was engaged in another capital felony or in 
aggravated battery; and (iii) the offense was "outrageously 
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved 
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the 
victim". Ante, at 3. 
\ct I J •• ,7'\.1.~"'-'!_ 
Only the b&~F~describes in general the 
offense of aggravated rape, often identifed as a 
separate and more heinous offense than rape. 
Petitioner Coker/, apparently an incorrigible'\ 
( criminal, ante at 1, \escaped from prison on 
September 2, 1974, and on the same evening raped his 
victim at knife's point in the presence of her bound and 
gagged husband. As vicious as this crime was, it was 
not aggravated rape in the sense in which that crime 
may be distinguished from ordinary rape. The jury 
was not instructed to consider the third of Georgia's 
aggravating circumstance~~resumably because the evidence 
2. 
did not indicate that the rape itself was "outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman", or that there was an 
aggravated battery. 
Thus, the case presented for our decision is 
not one of aggravated rape as defined by the relevant 
provision of the Georgia statute. It therefore ~ tS 
unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so sweeping as 
apparently to foreclose each of the fifty state 
legislatures from creating a substantive crime of 
3. 
aggravated rape punishable by death. 
The Court holds, in accord with our decisions 
last Term, that: 
" .. the death penalty is not 
invariably cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment; it is not 
inherently barbaric or an unaccept-
able mode of punishment for crime; 
neither is it always disporportionate 
to the crime for which it is imposed." 
Ante at 5. 
The Court then concludes that a "sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, is ex-
cessive and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amend-
ment". Ante at 7. If this conclusion were limited to 
the case before us>or to the crime of rape free from the 
type of aggravating circumstances mentioned below, I would 
be in entire accord with the judgment of 
disproportionality. 
Rapes, however, are not fungible. As noted in 
4 . 
Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626, 627 (CA 4 1966), "there is 
extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists". 
A high percentage of rapes involve no aggravated circum-
stances either in the manner in which the crime is 
committed or in the effect upon the victim. The range, 
both of culpability and effect upon the victim, may well be 
broader in the crime of rape than with respect to any other 
common law crime. Thus, in what might be called the usual 
rape case I agree that capital punishment is grossly 
execessive and therefore violative of the Eighth Amendment. 
But all rapes cannot be characterized as 
"usua~ • Some are the most atrocious intrusions upon the 
personal privacy and dignity of the victim known to the 
law. And some result in the most serious consequences. 
The Court itself acknowledgelthat rape is one of the 
ugliest of crimes: 
"It is highly reprehensible, both 
in a moral sense and in its total 
contempt for the personal integrity and 
autonomy of the female victim and for 
the latter's privilege of choosing 
5. 
~ those with whom intimate 
relationships ought to be estab-
lished. Short of homicide, it is 
the 'ultimate violation of self'". 
Ante at 12. 
In addition, rape is never a crim~ committed accidentally; 
rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated; often the 
victim suffers serious physical injury; and the psychological 
consequences may be more serious even than permanent 
bodily harm. 
Yet, despite the almost infinite variation 
vJ• 
in the degree of brutality ~~ which this offense can 
be committed and in its effect upon the victim, the 
Court simply treats all rapes alike. The Court then 
draws a bright line between rapes and murder. It is 
said life is "over for the victim of the murderer; for 
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it 
was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond 
repair." In its next sentence, the Court expresses an 
"abiding conviction that the death penalty . . is an 
excessive penalty for the rapist •. " Ante at 13. 
This conviction apparently includes the victim whose 
6 • 
life is "beyond repair'', a view that I cannot 
accept. 
The history of this crime abundantly 
documents that life may indeed lose its meaning for the 
victim so grievously injured physically or psychologically 
as never again to live normally. There have been 
surviving rape victims for whom the consequences are 
worse than death. It cannot be said as to every rape 
case that the victim's "life .•. is not beyond repair." 
The Court ignores the degree of culpability 
of the assailant as well as the effect upon the victim. 
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater 
than that of the murderer . The crime of murder often 
is committed (as in felony murder for example) with 
far less premeditation and less deliberately demeaning 
of the victim than in many rapes. 
In my view, this Court should not deny 
to the legislative branch of government the right to 
identify the elements of aggravation that may justify 
capital punishment for rape. One need not undertake 
in this case formulation of the relevant criteria. 
Georgia describes them as when the offense is committed 
J 
"outrageously or wanton¥ vile, horrible or inhuman in 
7. 
that it involved torture, depravity qf mind, or an 
aggravated battery to the victim." The Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Ralph v. Warden, 
438 F.2d 786 (1970), held that the death penalty was 
an appropriate punishment for rape only where the life 
of the victim was "in danger". Chief Judge Hayntsworth, 
v 
who joined in the panel's opinion, thought that this 
test was appropriate in that case. In general, he 
views capital punishment as excessive and violative of 
the Eighth Amendment unless the victim in fact suffered 
"grej/TOus physical ,or psychological harm". Id., at 794. 
But I would eschew attempting any formu-
lation of a disproportionality test, as this properly 
is a legislative function. I do think the test should 
embrace consideration of the factors discussed above: 
the culpability of the offender, the circumstances and 
manner in which the offense was committed, and the 
consequences suffered by the victim. Where a state 
statute prescribes appropriately the elements of the 
offense of aggravated rape, and provides the other 
safeguards that we identified in Gregg, I would find 
no basis for holding that death always is a dispropor-
tllf .. -1'~~ /f..V ~ 
tionate penalty for this &rieme most sordid of all 
A 
crimes. The death penalty thus would be reserved only 
8 . 
for the rare case of a rape so outrageous and so 
serious in its consequences as to justify society's 
ultimate penalty. 
">/~~111 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I agree that the death penalty amounts to dispropor-
tionate punishment for the offense committed by the 
petitioner. 
~v,\IC..fiCiolo t .. , ~ 
Rape is,s; , aye 4 s•:e,.~ serious crime, but 
there is no indication here of excessive viciousness on 
pe titioner's part or of serious, lasting harm to tre 
victim. In holding that capital punishment is ~lways 
a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping 
an adult woman, however, the Court's opinion ranges 
well beyond what is necessary to decide this case. 
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976), specifies aggravating circum-
~ stances that may be consider~ by the jury when 
appropriate. With respect to the crime of rape, only 
three such circumstances are specified: (i) tte 
offense was committed by a person with a prior record 
of conviction for a capital ~·*~ felony; (ii) the 
offense was committed while the offender was engaged in 
another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and 
(iii) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horribleJror inhuman in that it involved torture, depravi~ 
-2-
of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." Ante, 
at 3. Only the third circumstance describes in general 
the offense of aggravated rape, often identified as a 
separate and more heinous offense than rape. See,~' 
Model Penal Code § 207.4, comment at 246 (Tent. Draft No. 
4, 1955); Nev. Rev. Stat. §200.363; 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 
c. 1201' ~ 2(a)(2)~ That third circumstance was not 
submitted to the jury in this case, as the evidence 
such 
would not have supported/a finding. It is therefore 
~1inappropriate for the Court to write in terms 
so sweeping as necessarily to foreclose e ach of the 
fifty state legislatures from creating a narrowly defined 
substantive crime of aggravated rape punishable by 
"the death penalty is not invariably cruel and 
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an 
unacceptable ' mode of punishment for crime; nefrher 
is it always disproportionate to the crime for 
which it is imposed." Ante, at 5. 
d' ,.; ,.sa nf 




A~~~~ ~@A~l~~ may be imposed on those sentenced 
in accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and 
Woodson, ~ at least when the offender is convicted of -
murder, the crime involved in all five of last Term's 
capital cases. 
Today, in a case that does not require such an 
t_)(rAA~;II ~ 
--·~~piR§-~pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line 
between murder and all rapes. I dissent .m~aem because 
I am by no means persuaded that such a bright line 
is appropriate. As noted in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.~ 1 
" [1..] ~(e. 
626, 627 (CA4 1966), ~is extreme variation in the 
degree of culpability of ~:H:~ rapists." The 
deliberate viciousness of the ~kw rapist may be greater 
than that of the murderer. Rape is never an act committed 
accidentally. 
~~eftXfti~~» Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. 
There is equal variation in effect on the victim. The 
Court says that "[l]ife is over for the victim of the 
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly 
so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is 
not beyond repair ." Ante, at 13. But rapes are not 
I 
fungible. Some victims are so grievously injured physically~ 
or psychologically that life is beyond repair. 
~~;~ 
A 
may be that the death penalty.ts not disproportion-
-4-
ate punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final · 
resolution of the question must await a thorough and 
careful inquiry into objective indicators of society's 
"evolving standards of decency," particularly legislative 
enactments and the responses of juries in capital cases. 
See Gregg v. Georgi~, 428 U.S, at 173-182 (plurality 
opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S., at 294-295 
(plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.,at 
436-443 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court properly 
examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion 
that society finds the death penalty unacceptable for 
I 
I 
the usual rape case. But it has not been shown that society 
ro.p•'s~, I 
finds the penalty disproportionate for all.A.1:apescaees, 1l- I 
T"" P- ft'oro..,-- ~ ct. 
~more discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes 
~iML&welizms well might discover that both juries and 
legislatures have reserved tre ultimate penalty for the 
rare case of an outrageous rape resulting in serious, 
lasting harm to the victim. I ·would not prejudge "the 
issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent. 
Coker --footnotes 
1. ' Tile North Carolina provision was part of the 
mandatory death penalty statute struck down in Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. "2-~ (1976) . 
2. @Hex-aelb!Lww!sanwti. It is not this Court's function 
criteria that might 
to formulate the relevant/distinguis~ aggravated rape 
a workable 
fromG the more usual case, but perhaps/~~ test 
would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the 
gMl~a~ilik~ cruelty or viciousness of the offender, 
the circumstances and manner in which the offense was 
committed, and the consequences suffered by the victim. 
~. ~t.JI..' '/~ \). ~. C)l.{2- (let 7'L.); 
See also Ralp v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (CA4 1970) 
g.j at 794 
difficulty 
(Haynsworth, J.). I do not minimize the 
-- ~Ma-..a.. in ~ ts di!fSijijat:e=J:I i 
constitutional 
/requirements.tl 
~ (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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Ehrlich Anthony Coker,) 
Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the Su. 
v. preme Court of Georgia. 
State of Georgia. 
[May-, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of thig 
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that or ... 
dinarily tfte. death ~i:lt~' is disproportionate J or the Crime 
of raping an adult woman. Although rape is invariably a 
serious crime, there is no indication that petitioner's offense: 
was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim 
sustai11ed serious or lasting injury. The Court does not, 
however. limit its holding to the case before us or to similar 
cases. Rather. in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is 
l'lecessary, the Court holds that capital punishment always-
regardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty 
for the crime of rape. 
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,· 
428 U. S. 153 (1976). specifies aggravating circumstances 
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate. 
With respect to the crime of rape, only three such cir-
cumstances are specified: ( i) the offense was committed by 
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony; 
(ii) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged 
iu another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and· 
(iii) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or 
an aggravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3.' Only the" 
75-5444-CONCUR & DISSENT 
2 COKER v. GEORGIA 
third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra· 
vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinous 
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4, 
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (Pro· 
posed Official Dra.ft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363; 1973 
N. C. Sess. Laws, c. 1201, § 2 (a) (2).1 That third circum· 
stance was not submitted to the jury in this case, as the evi-
dence would not have supported such a finding. It is there-
fore quite unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so 
sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from 
creating a narrowly defined sqbstantive crime of aggravated 
rape punishable by death.2 
In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that: 
"The death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable 
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always dis-
proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed." 
Ante, at 5. 
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced 
iu accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and 
Woodson, at least when the offender is convicted of murder, 
the crime involved in all five of last Terrri's capital cases. 
1 The North Carolina provision was part of the mandatory death 
penalty statute struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976). 
2 It is not this Court's function to formulate the relevant criteria that 
might distinguish aggrava,ted rape from the more usual case, but perhaps 
a workable test would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the 
cruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner in 
whiCh the offpnse was committed, and the consequences suffered by the 
viciim. See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert. 
-dPnied, 408 U. S. 942 (1972) ; id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.). 
The legi:;lative task of defining, with appropriate specificity, the elements 
of the offense of aggravatt>d rape would not be easy, see Furman v. 
Gl.'orqw, 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (PowELL, J ., dissenting), but cer .. 
taml;} tins Court should not ass\1me that the task is impossible. 
75-5444-CONCUR & DISSENT 
COKER v. GEORGIA 3 
Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive 
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder 
and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the 
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am 
not persuaded that such a bright line is appropriate. As noted 
in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966), "[t]here 
is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists." 
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than 
that of the murderer. Rape is never an act committed acci-
dentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. · There 
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court 
says that "[1] ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for 
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, 
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair:" Ante, 
at 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so 
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is 
beyond repair. 
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportion-
fl,te punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final 
resolution of the question must await careful inqtJiry into ob-
jective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency," 
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries 
in capital cases. 3 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173-182 
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S., 
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., 
at 436--443 (PowELL, J., dissenting). The Court properly 
examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion th11t 
society finds the death penalty unacceptable for the usual rape 
case. But it has not been shown that society finds the penalty 
disproportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more 
discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might 
3 These objectiv<' indicators are highly relevant., but the ultimate deci-
sion as to the appropriatenel>S of the ·death . penalty under the Eighth 
\mendment-m; the Court notes, ·ante, at 12-must be "decided on the 
I~H !-ilH of OlJr own judgment in light of · the precedents of thi!il Court. 
75-5444-CONCUR & DISSENT 
4 COKER v. GEORGIA 
discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the 
ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting 
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge 
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent. 
1st D!tAFT 
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Ehrlich Anthony Coker,) 
Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the Su-
v. preme Court of Georgia. 
State of Georgia. 
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of thig 
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that or ... 
dinarily the death penalty is disproportionate for the crime 
of raping an adult woman. Although rape is invariably a 
serious crime, there is no indication that petitioner's offense: 
was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim 
sustaiued serious or lasting injury. The Court does not, 
however. limit its holding to the case before us or to similar 
cases. Rather. in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is 
necessary, the Court holds that capital punishment always-
regardless of the. circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty 
for the crime of rape. 
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,· 
428 U. S. 153 ( 1976). specifies aggravating circumstances 
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate. 
With respect to the crime of rape, only three such cir-
cumstances are specified: (i) the offense was committed by 
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony; 
( 1i ) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged 
iu another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and 
(iii ) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or 
an a~gravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3. Only the· 
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third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra· 
vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinous 
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4, 
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (Pro· 
posed Official Draft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363; 1973 
N. C. Sess. Laws, c. 1201, § 2 (a) (2). 1 That third circum-
stance was not submitted to the jury in this case, as the evi-
dence would not have supported such a finding. It is there-
fore quite unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so 
sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from 
creating a narrowly defined sqbstantive crime of aggravated 
rape punishable by death.2 
In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that: 
"The death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable 
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always dis-
proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed." 
Ante, at 5. 
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced 
iu accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and 
Woodson, at least wheu the offender is convicted of murder, 
the crime involved in all five of last Terrri's capital cases. 
1 The North Carolina provision was part of the mandatory death 
nenalty statute struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976) . 
2 lt is not this Court's function to formulate the relevant criteria that 
might distinguish aggravated rape from the more usual case, but perhaps 
a workable test would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the 
cruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner · in 
which the offense was committed, and the consequences suffered by the 
v1etim. See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert . 
.Oemt>d, 408 U. S. 942 (1972) ; id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.). 
T he legislative taHk of defining, with appropriate specificity, the elements 
of the offenst' of aggravated rape would not be easy, see Furman v, 
(if!oryia, 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (PowELL, J., dissenting), but cer-. 
tmnlJ this Court should not as:l\tme that the task is impossible. 
' . 
75-5444-CONCUR & DISSENT 
COKER v. GEORGIA 3 
Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive 
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder 
and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the 
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am 
not persuaded that SU{)h a bright line is appropriate. As noted 
in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966) , "[t]here 
is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists." 
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than 
that of the murderer.' Rape is never an act committed acci-
dentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. · There 
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court 
says that "[11 ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for 
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, 
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Ante, 
at 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so 
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life ·is 
beyond repair. 
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportion-
;tte punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final 
resolution of the question must await careful inquiry into ob-
jective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency," 
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries 
in capital cases.a See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173-182 
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S., 
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., 
at 436-443 (PowELL, J. , dissenting). The Court properly 
examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion that 
society finds the death penalty unacceptable for the usual rape 
case. But it has not been shown that society finds the penalty 
disproportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more 
discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might 
3 Thrse objectivl' indicators are highly relevant, but the ultimate deci-
~JOn aR to thr appropriatrne:::s of the death penalty under the Eighth 
.-\mendmrnt-ao; thl' Court notes, ·ante, at 12-must be decided on the 
l~:lRi~ ol' O\lr own judgment in light of · the precedenti;i of thii;i Court. 
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discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the 
ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting 
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge 
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent. 
• , 7 . f..t. -;& ....... Cn rae: PKUU sci '! • 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-5444 
Ehrlich Anthony Coker,) 
Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the Su-
v. preme Court of Georgia. 
State of Georgia. 
[May-, 1977] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of thig 
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that or ... 
dinarily the death penalty is disproportionate for the crime · 
of raping an adult ·woman. Although rape §}invariabi~ a 
.,...t-+ __ ~··'-ts crime, there is no indication that petitioner's offense:1 
was committed with excessive brutality or that the victim 
sustaitu'u serious or lasting injury. The Court does not, 
owever, limit its holding to the case before us or to similar 
cases. Rather . in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is 
necessary, the Court holds that capital punishment always-
regardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty 
for the crime o~pe. 
The Georgia statute. sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,· 
428 U. S. 153 (1976). specifies aggravating circumstances 
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate. 
'With respect to the crime of rape, only three such cir-
cumstances are specified: ( i) the offense was committed by 
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony; 
( ti ) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged 
iu another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and 
(iii ) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or· 
an aggravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3. Only the· 
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third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra· 
vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinous 
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4, 
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (Pro .. 
posed Official Draft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.36~ (Itt?~ (t.v.} . 
,....-~~~--.r;::::;;;;w;~~!@ii,-~' ~ .. ~., That third circum .. 
stance was not submitted to the jury in this case, as the evi-
dence would not have supported such a finding. It is there .. 
fore quite unnecessary for the Court to write in terms so 
sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from 
creating a narrowly defined sqbstantive crime of aggravated' .• J~ 
rape punishable by death!b v 
'--"In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that: 
"The death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable 
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always dis .. 
proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed." 
Ante, at 5. 
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced 
i11 accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and 
Tr oodson, at least when the offender is convicted of murder, 
the crime involved in all five of last Term's capital cases. 
1e orth Carolina provision was part of the mandatory eat 
~--...1 p<'nalty statute struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976). 
IS not t us ourt's function to formulate the relevant criteria that 
might, distinguish aggrava,ted rape from the more usual case, but perhaps 
a workable test would embrace the factors identified by Georgia: the 
cruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner ·in 
winch the offense was committed, and the consequences sufferl:'d by the 
v1ctim. See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F. 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert. 
demPd, 408 U. S. 942 (1972); id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.). 
The legislativl:' task of defining, with appropriate specificity, the elements 
of the offl:'nsl:' of aggravatPd rape would not be easy, see Furman v. 
Geuroia, 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (POWELL, J., dissenting), but ceh 
t~ml) tl11~ Court should not aSS\IIne that the task is impossible. 
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Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive 
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder 
and all rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the 
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am 
not persuaded that sueh a bright line is appropriate. As notecr-
in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966), "[t]here 
ls extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists." 
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than 
that of the murderer. Rape is never an act committed acci-
dentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. · There 
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court 
says that "[1] ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for 
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, 
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Ante, 
at 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so 
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is 
beyond repair. 
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportion-
;:tte punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final 
resolution of the question must await careful inquiry into ob-
jective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency," 
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries 
in capital cases~ See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 173-182 
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S., 
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., 
at 436-443 (PowELL, J. , dissenting). The Court properly 
examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion that 
G
ociety finds the death penalty unacceptable for 
~But it has not been shown that society finds the penalty 
disproportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more 
discriminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might 
'-¥ GThe~e objectivr indicators are highly relevant, but the ultimate deci-
~ Jon as to tlw appropriatrne~s of the death . penalty under the Eighth 
.\mcndmcnt-as thr Court notes, -ante, at 12-must be ·decided on the 
hn Ri~ of 0\11' own .i ud~ment in light of · the precedents of thif:l Court. 
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discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the 
ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting 
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge 
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent. 
2nd DRAFT 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court on the facts of this 
case, and also in its reasoning supporting the view that or-
dinarily the death penalty is disproportionate for the crime 
pf raping an adult woman. Although rape invariably is a 
reprehensible crime, there is no indication that petitioner's of-
fense was committed with excessive brutality or that the vic-
tim sustained serious or lasting injury.. The Court does not, 
however, limit its holding to the case before us or to similar 
cases. Rather, in an opinion that ranges well beyond what is 
necessary, the Court holds that capital punishment always-
regardless of the circumstances-is a disproportionate penalty 
for the crime of rape. 
The Georgia statute, sustained in Gregg v. Georgia,· 
428 U. S. 153 ( 1976), specifies aggravating circumstances 
that may be considered by the jury when appropriate. 
With respect to the crime of rape, only three such cir-
cumstances are specified: (i) the offense was committed by 
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony; 
(ii) the offense was committed while the offender was engaged 
~n another capital felony or in aggravated battery; and 
(iii) the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or 
an aggravated battery to the victim." Ante, at 3. Only the 
third circumstance describes in general the offense of aggra--
' . 
75-5444-CONCUR & DISSENT 
2 COKER v. GEORGIA 
vated rape, often identified as a separate and more heinou~ 
offense than rape. See, e. g., Model Penal Code § 207.4, 
Comment, p. 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955); id., § 213.1 (Pro-
1 
IJ. -r . 
posed Official Draft, 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.363 (1975 / ~
.Rev.). That third circumstance was not submitted to the 
jury in this case, as the evidence would not have supported 
such a finding. It is therefore quite unnecessary for the Court 
to write in t€rms so sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 
state legislatures from creating a narrowly defined substan~ 
tive crime of aggravated rape punishable by death.1 
In accord with our decisions last Term, the Court holds that: 
"The death penalty is not ipvariably cruel and unusual 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable 
mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always dis-
proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed." 
Ante, at 5. 
Thus, capital punishment may be imposed on those sentenced 
in accordance with the procedures identified in Gregg and 
Woodson, at least when the offender is convicted of murder, 
the crime involved in all five of last Tenn.'s capital cases. 
Today, in a case that does not require such an expansive 
pronouncement, the Court draws a bright line between murder 
and all rapes-rega.rdless of the degree of brutality of the 
rape and the effect upon the victim. I dissent because I am I 
1 It. i~ not this Court's function to formulate the relevant criteria that 
might distingui:;h aggrava.ted rape from the more usual case, but perhaps 
iL workable te:;t. would embrace the factor:; identified by Georgia: the 
eruelty or viciousness of the offender, the circumstances and manner in 
which the offense was committed, and the consequences suffered by the 
vie tim . See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F . 2d 786 (CA4 1970), cert, 
dc·nied, 408 U. S. 942 (1972) ; id., at 794 (opinion of Haynsworth, J.). 
The lPgi:;lative tilsk of defining, wit.h appropriate specificity, the elements 
of the offense of aggravated rape wopld not be easy, see Furman v. 
Georgia. 408 U. S. 238, 460 (1972) (PowELL, J., dissenting), but cer~ 
i '' inly t hi.R Court should not ass1,1me that the task is impossible. 
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not persuaded that such a bright line is appropriate. As noted 
in Snider v. Peyton, 356 F. 2d 626, 627 (CA4 1966), "[t]here 
is extreme variation in the degree of culpability of rapists." 
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than 
that of the murderer. Rape is never an act committed acci-
dentally. Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. There 
also is wide variation in the effect on the victim. The Court 
says that "[l] ife is over for the victim of the murderer; for 
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, 
but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair." Ante, 
1tt 13. But rapes are not fungible. Some victims are so 
grievously injured physically or psychologically that life is 
.beyond repair. 
Thus it may be that the death penalty is not disproportion-
(:l.te punishment for the crime of aggravated rape. Final 
resolution of the question must await careful inquiry into ob-
jective indicators of society's "evolving standards of decency," 
particularly legislative enactments and the responses of juries 
in capital cases. 2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 173-182 
(plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S., 
at 294-295 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., 
at 436-443 (PowELL, J., dissenting). The Court properly 
.examines these indicia, which do support the conclusion that 
society finds the death penalty unacceptable for the crime of 
rape in the absence of aggravating circumstances. But it 
has not been shown that society finds the penalty dis-
proportionate for all rapists. In a proper case a more dis-
criminating inquiry than the Court undertakes well might 
discover that both juries and le~islatures have reserved the 
;ultimate penalty for the case of an outrageous rape resulting 
in serious, lasting harm to the victim. I would not prejudge 
the issue. To this extent, I respectfully dissent. 
~These objective indicators are highly relevant, but the ultimate deci-
sion as to the appropriateness of the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment-as the Court notes, ante, at 12-must be decidrd on the 
,basis of our own judgm«:>nt in light of the precedents of this Court. 
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To: M · Just1ce Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~r. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: The Chief Justioe 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissentingfteoiroulated: -------
In a case such as this, confusion often arises as 
to what is the Court's proper role in reaching a decision . 
Our task is not to give effect to our individual views 
on capital punishment; rather, we have taken oaths to 
determine what the Constitution pennits a State to do 
under its reserved powers. In striking down the death 
penalty imposed upon the petitioner in this case, the Court 
has overstepped the bounds of proper constitutional 
adjudication by substituting its policy judgment for that 
of the State legislature. I accept that the Eight.h Amend-
ment's concept of disproportionality bars the death penalty 
for minor crimes~ But rape is not a minor crime; hence 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does net give the 
Members of this Court license to engraft their conceptions 
of proper public policy concerning the death penalty onto 
the considered legislative judgments of the States. Since 
I cannot agree that Georgia lacked the constitutional power 
to impose the penalty of death for rape, I dissent from 
the Court's judgment. 
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(1) 
On December 5, 1971, the petitioner, Ehrlich Anthony 
Coker, raped and then stabbed to death a young woman. Less 
than eight months later Coker kidnapped and raped a second 
young woman. After twice raping this sixteen-year old 
victim, he stripped her, severely beat her with a club, and 
dragged her into a wooded area where he left her for dead. 
He was apprehended and pleaded guilty to offenses stemming 
from these incidents. He was sentenced by three separate 
courts to three life terms, two 20-year terms, and one 
1/ 
eight-year term of imprisonment.- Each judgment specified 
that the sentences it imposed were to run consecutively 
rather than concurrently. Approximately one and one-half 
years later, on September 2, 1974, petitioner escaped from 
the State prison where he was serving these sentences. He 
promptly raped another 16-year-old woman in the presence of 
her husband, abducted heL from her horne, and threatened her 
!/ On March 12, 1973, the Superior Court of Richmond 
County, Georgia, sentenced Coker to twenty years' 
imprisonment for the kidnapping of petitioner's 
second victim, and to life imprisonment for one 
act of rape upon her. On May 28, 1973, the Superior 
Court of Taliaferro County, Georgia, sentenced 
Coker to eight years' imprisonment for aggravated 
assault upon the same victim, and to life imprison-
ment for the second rape upon her. On April 6, 
1973, the Superior Court of Clayton County, Georgia, 
sentenced Coker to twenty years' imprisonment for 
the rape of petitioner's first victim, and to life 
imprisonment for her murder. Appendix, at 306-312. 
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with death and serious bodily harm. It is this crime for 
which the sentence now under review was imposed. 
The Court today holds that the State of Georgia may 
not impose the death penalty on Coker. In so doing, it 
prevents the State from imposing any effective punishment 
upon Coker for his latest rape. The Court's holding, 
moreover, bars Georgia from guaranteeing its citizens that 
they will suffer no further attacks by this habitual rapist. 
In fact, given the lengthy sentences Coker must serve for 
the rapes he is known to have committed, the Court's holding 
assures that petitioner -- and others in his position -- will 
henceforth feel no compunction whatsoever about committing 
further rapes as frequently as they may be able to escape 
from confinement and indeed even within the walls of 
the prison itself. To what extent we have left states 
''elbow room" to deal with depraved human beings like Coker 
so as to protect others remains in doubt. 
(2) 
My first disagreement with the Court's holding is 
its unnecessary breadth. The narrow issue here presented 
is whether the State of Georgia may constitutionally execute 
this petitioner for the particular rape which he has 
committed, in light of all the facts and circumstances shown 
- 4 -
by this record. The plurality opinion goes to great lengths 
to consider societal mores and attitudes toward the generic 
crime of rape and punishment for it; however, the opinion 
gives little attention on the special circumstances which bear 
directly on whether imposition of the death penalty is an 
appropriate societal response to Coker's criminal acts: 
(a) On account of his prior offenses, Coker is already serving 
such lengthy prison sentences that imposition of additional 
periods of imprisonment would have no incremental punitive 
effect; (b) by his life pattern Coker has shown that he 
presents a particular danger to the safety, welfare and 
chastity of women generally, and on his record the likelihood 
is therefore great that he will repeat his crime at first 
opportunity; (c) petitioner escaped from prison, only a year 
and a half after he commenced serving his latest sentences; 
he has nothing to lose by further escape attempts; and (d) 
should he again succeed in escaping from prison, it is 
reasonably predictable that he will repeat his pattern of 
attacks on women and with impunity since the threat of added 
prison sentences is no deterrent. 
Unlike the Court, I would at the very least narrow 
the inquiry in this case to the question actually presented: 
Does the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibit the State of Georgia from executing a 
- 5 -
person who has, within the space of three years, raped three 
separate women, killing one and attempting to kill -- and 
leaving for dead -- another , who is serving prison terms 
exceeding his probable lifetime and who has not hesitated 
to escape confinement at the first available opportunity? 
Whatever one's view may be as to the State's constitutional 
power to impose the death penalty upon a rapist who stands 
before a court convicted for the first time, this case 
reveals a chronic rapist whose danger to the community is 
abundantly clear. 
Mr. Justice Powell would hold the death sentence in-
appropriate in this case because 11 there is no indication that 
petitioner's offense was committed with excessive brutality 
or that the victim sustained serious or lasting injury ... 
2/ 
Ante, at 1.- Apart from the reality that rape is inherently 
~/ The position today adopted by Mr. Justice Powell 
constitutes a disquieting shift from the view he 
embraced several Terms ago in Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 460-61 (1972), where he stated: 
11 While I reject each of [petitioners'] attempts 
to establish specific categories of cases in 
which the death penalty may be deemed excessive, 
I view them as groping toward what is for me the 
appropriate application of the Eighth Amendment. 
While in my view the disproportionality test may 
not be used either to strike down the death 
penalty for rape altogether or to 1nstall the 
Court as a tribunal for sentencing review, that 
test may find its appl1cat1on in the pecul1ar 
circumstances of speciflc cases. Its utilization 
should be l1m1ted to the rare case 1n wh1ch the 
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one of the most egregiously brutal acts one human being 
can inflict upon another, there is nothing in the Eighth 
Amendment that so narrowly limits the factors which may be 
considered by a State Legislature in determining whether a 
particular punishment is grossly excessive. Surely 
recidivism, especially the repeated commission of heinous 
crimes, is a factor which may properly be weighed as an 
aggravating circumstance, permitting the imposition of a 
punishment more severe than for a single isolated offense. For ex~le, 
as a matter of national policy, Congress has expressed its 
will that a person who has committed two felonies will suffer 
enhanced punishment for a third one, 18 u.s.c. §3575(e) (1); 
Congress has also declared that a second conviction for 
assault on a mail carrier may be punished more seriously 
than a first such conviction, id. §2114. Many States provide 
an increased penalty for habitual criminality. See, e.g., 
Wis. Stat. §939.62; see also Annot, 58 A.L.R. 20, 82 A.L.R. 
3/ 
345, 79 A.L.R.2d . 826.- As a factual matter, the plurality 
~/ Continued -
death penalty is rendered for a crime technically 
falllng within the legislatlvely defined class 
but factually falling outs1de the l1kely legis-
lative intent in creating the category. Specific 
rape cases (and speclflc hom1c1des as well) can 
be imagined in which the conduct of the accused 
would render the ultimate penalty as grossly 
excessive punishment." [Emphasis added.] 
ll This Court has consistently upheld the constitutional 
validity of such punishment-enhancing statutes. 
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opinion is correct in stating that Coker's "prior convictions 
do not change the fact that the instant crime being punished 
is rape not involving the taking of life," ante, at 14; 
however, it cannot be disputed that the existence of these 
prior convictions make Coker a substantially more serious 
4/ 
menace to society than a first-time offender:-
"There is a widely held view that those 
who present the strongest case for severe 
~./ Continued -
See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 559-60 
(1967F 
"No claim is made here that recidivist 
statutes are ... unconstitutional, nor could 
there be under our cases. Such statutes and 
other enhanced-sentence laws, and procedures 
designed to implement their underlying policies, 
have been enacted in all the States, and by 
the Federal Government as well . . . . Such 
statutes . . • have been sustained in this 
Court on several occasions against contentions 
that they violate constitutional strictures 
dealing with double jeopardy, ex post facto 
laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, 
equal protection, and privileges and immunities." 
(Footnote and citations omitted; emphasis added.) 
Accord Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962). 
!/ This special danger is demonstrated by the very 
record in this case. After tying and gagging 
the victim's husband, and raping the victim, 
petitioner sought to make his getaway in their 
automobile. Leaving the victim's husband tied 
and gagged in his bathroom, Coker took the victim 
with him. As he started to leave, he brandished 
the kitchen knife he was carrying and warned 
the husband that "if he would get pulled over 
or the police was following him in any way that 
he would kill -- he would kill my wife. He said 
he didn't have nothing to lose -- that he was in 
pr1son for the rest of his life, anyway .... " 
Testimony of the victim's husband, Appendix, at 
121 (emphasis added) • 
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measures of incapacitation are not murderers 
as a group (their offenses often are 
situational) but rather those who have 
repeatedly engaged in v1ole nt, combative 
behavior. A well-demonstrated prope nsity 
for life-endangering behavior is thought 
to provide a more solid basis for infliction 
of the most severe measures of incapacitation 
than does the fortuity of a single homicidal 
incident." Packer, Making the Punishment 
Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1080 
(1964). [Emphasis added.] 
~n my view, the Eighth Amendment does not prevent 
the State from taking an individual's "well demonstrated 
propensity for life-endangering behavior" into account in 
devising punitive measures which will prevent inflicting 
further harm upon innocent victims. See Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 183 n.28 (1976). Only one year ago Mr. Justice 
White succinctly noted: "death finally forecloses the 
possibility that a prisoner will commit further crimes, 
whereas life imprisonment does not." Robert v. Louisiana, 
428 U.S. 325, 354 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); see also, 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.-S., at 238 (White~ · J., concurring). 
In sum, once the Court has held that "the punishment 
of death does not invariably violate the Constitution," 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 169, it seriously impinges 
upon the State's legislative judgment to hold that it may not 
impose such sentence upon an individual who has shown total 
and repeated disregard for the welfare, safety, personal 
integrity and human worth of others, and who seemingly 
- 9 -
~/ 
cannot be deterred from continuing such conduct. I 
therefore would hold that the death sentence here imposed 
is within the power reserved to the State and leave for 
another day the question of whether such sanction would be 
proper under other circumstances. The dangers which 
inhere whenever the Court casts its constitutional decisions 
in terms sweeping beyond the facts of the case presented, 
are magnified in the context of the Eighth Amendment. In 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 238, !-1r. Justice Powell, in 
dissent, stated: 
11 Where, as here, the language of the applicable 
[constitutional] provision provides great 
leeway and where the underlying social policies 
are felt to be of vital importance, the tempta-
tion to read personal preference into the Con-
stitution is understandably great. It is 
too easy to propound our subjective standards 
of wise pollcy under the rubrlc of more or less 
universally held standards of decency." 
(Emphasis added.) 
~/ Professor Packer addressed this: 
11 What are we to do with those whom we cannot 
reform, and in particular, those who by our 
failure are thought to remain menaces to 
life? Current penal theories admit, indeed 
insist upon, the need for permanent incapaci-
tation in such cases. Once this need is 
recognized,the death penalty as a means 
for incapacitation for the violent psychopath 
can hardly be objected to on grounds that will 
survive rational scrutiny, if the use of the 
death penalty in any situation lS to be 
permitted. And its use in rape cases as a 
class, while inept, is no more so than its 
use for any other specific offense involving 
danger to life and limb." 77 Harv. L. Rev., 
at 1081. (Emphasis added.) 
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Since the Court now invalidates the death penalty as a 
sanction for all rapes of adults at all times under all 
§/ 
circumstances, I reluctantly turn to what I see as the 
broader issues raised by this holding. 
( 3) 
The plurality, pp. 12-13 ante, acknowledges the 
gross nature of the crime of rape. A rapist not only 
violates a victim's privacy and personal integrity, but 
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical 
harm in the process. The long-range effect upon the victim's 
life and health is likely to be irreparable; it is impossible 
to measure the harm which results. Volumes have been 
written by victims, physicians and psychiatric specialists 
on the lasting injury suffered by rape victims. Rape is 
not a mere physical attack -- it is destructive of the human 
personality. For some victims, and many of these are 
documented medic~lly, it distorts the balance of the victim's 
§./ I find a disturbing confusion as to th i s issue in 
the plurality opinion. The issue is whether 
Georgia can, under any circumstances and for any 
kind of rape -- "mild" or "gross" -- impose the 
death penalty. Yet the plurality opinion opens 
its discussion, apparently directed at demonstrat-
ing that this was not an "aggravated" rape, saying 
that following the rape and kidnapping, "Mrs. 
Carver was unharmed." (Ante,p.2.) If the Court 
is holding that no rape can ever be punished by 
death, why is it relevant whether Mrs. Carver was 
"unharmed"? 
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life. If the victim has children before or after the 
attack the victim's trauma can readily affect them --
and indeed the husband and the home life of all involved. 
I therefore wholly agree with Mr. Justice White's conclusion 
as far as it goes-- that "[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is 
the 'ultimate violation of the self.' " Ante, at 12. 
Victims may recover from the physical damage of knife or 
bullet wounds, or a beating with fists or a club, but 
recovery from the assault on a human personality is not 
healed by medicine or surgery. To speak blandly of rape 
victims "unharmed," or classify the human outrage of rape 
in terms of "brutal" versus "non-brutal" takes no account 
of the profound suffering the crime imposes on the victims 
or their loved ones. 
Despite its strong condemnations of rape, the Court 
reaches the inexplicable conclusion that "the death penalty . 
is an excessive penalty" for the perpetrator of this heinous 
7/ - -
offense.- This, _ the Court holds, is true even though in 
Georgia the death penalty may be imposed only where the rape 
is coupled with one or more aggravating circumstances and 
the absence of mitigating circumstances. The process by 
which this conclusion is reached is as startling as it is 
II While only three Justices have joined Mr. 
Justice White in this portion of his opinion, 
see separate opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, 
ante, I take this to be the view of the Court 
1n light of Mr. Justice Brennan's and Mr. 
Justice Marshall's statements joining the 
judgment. 
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disquieting. It represents a clear departure from precedent 
by making this Court "under the aegis of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the 
standards of criminal responsibility in diverse areas of the 
criminal law, throughout the country." Powell v. Texas, 392 
8/ 
U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (Opinion of Marshall, J.) .- This 
seriously strains and distorts our federal system, removing 
much of· the flexibility from which it has drawn strength 
for two centuries. 
The analysis of the plurality opinion is divided 
into two parts: (a) an "objective" determination that most 
American Jurisdictions do not presently make rape a capital 
offense, and (b) a subjective judgment that death is an 
excessive punishment for rape because the crime does not, 
in and of itself, cause the death of the victim. I take 
issue with each of these points. 
~/ Only last Term in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for Mr. 
Justice Powell, Mr. Justice Stevens and himself 
warned that "the requirement of the Eighth 
Amendment must be applied with an awareness of 
the limited role to be played by the courts," and 
noted that "we may not act as judges as we might 
as legislators" Id. at 174-75. Accord, Roberts 
v. Louisiana, 428-u.s. at 355-56 (White, J., 
dissenting). Mr. Justice Stewart further noted 
that "[t]he deference we owe to decisions of 
the state legislatures under our federal system, 
[Furman v. Georgia, 407 U.S.], at 465-470 (Rehnquist, J., 
d1ssenting) is enhanced where the specification 
of punishments is concerned, for 'these are 
peculiarly questions of l e gislative pol1cy.' 
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ." 
~u.s. at 176. (Emphasis added.) 
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(a) 
The plurality opinion bases its analysis, in part, 
on the fact that "Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in 
the United States at the present time that authorizes the 
sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman." 
Ante at 11; Surely, however, this statistic cannot be deemed 
determinative, or even particularly relevant. Would the 
position of the plurality be reversed if a majority of the 
states followed Georgia? As the opinion concedes, ante 
p. 9, two other States -- Louisiana and North Carolina --
have enacted death penalty statutes for adult rape since this 
Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238. 
If the Court is to rely on some "public opinion" process, 
does this not suggest the beginning of a "trend"'.? My view 
is that we should be wary of statistics and "trends" in this 
area. 
More to the point, however, it is ~~opic -- and novel 
to base sweeping constitutional principles upon the narrow 
experience of the past five years. Considerable uncertainty 
was introduced into this area of the law by this Court's 
Furman decision. A large number of States found their death 
penalty statutes invalidated; legislatures were left in serious 
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doubt by the expressions vacillating between discretionary 
and mandatory death penalties, as to whether this Court would 
9/ 
sustain any statute imposing death as a criminal sanction.-
Failure of more states to enact statutes imposing death for 
rape of an adult woman may thus reflect the result of hasty 
legislative compromise occasioned by time pressures following 
Furman 1 or a desire to wait on the experience of those States 
which did enact such statutes. 
In any case, when considered in light of the experience 
since the turn of this century, during which more than one 
third of American jurisdictions have consistently provided 
the death penalty for rape, the plurality's myopic focus on 
the experience of the immediate past must be viewed as truly 
disingenuous. Having in mind the swift changes in positions 
of some members of this Court in the short span of five years, 
can it rationally be considered a relevant indicator of what 
our society deems "crueLand unusual" to look solely to what 
legislatures have refrained from doing under conditions of 
~/ I take no satisfaction in my predictive caveat in 
Furman: 
"Since there is no majority of the Court on the 
ultimate issue presented in these cases, the future 
of capital punishment in this country has been 
left in an uncertain limbo. Rather than 
providing a final and unambiguous answer on 
the basic constitutional question, the col-
lective impact of the majority's ruling is to 
demand an undetermined measure of change from 
the various state legislatures and the Congress." 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 at 403 (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). 
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- . -great ~ncertainty arising from our less than lucid opinions 
on the Eighth Amendment? Far more representative of 
societal mores of the 20th Century is the accepted practice 
in a substantial number of jurisdictions preceding the 
Furman decision. "The problem . . • is the suddenness 
of the Court's perception of progress in the human attitude 
since decisions of only a short while ago." Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 u.s. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Cf. 
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963). 
However, even were one to give the most charitable 
acceptance to the plurality's statistical analysis, it still 
does not, to my mind, support its conclusion. The most that 
can be claimed is that for the past year Georgia has been the 
only State whose adult rape death penalty statute has not 
otherwise been invalidated; two other State legislatures had 
enacted rape death penalty statutes in the last five years, 
but these were invalidated for reasons unrelated to rape 
under the Court's decisions last Term. Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 
325 (1976). Even if these figures could be read as indicating 
that no other States view the death penalty as an appropriate 
punishment for the rape of an adult woman, it would not 
necessarily follow that Georgia's imposition of such sanction 
violates the Eighth Amendment. 
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The Court has repeatedly pointed to the reserve strength 
of our federal system which allows State legislatures, within 
broad limits, to experiment with laws, both criminal and 
civil, in the effort to achieve socially desirable results. 
See, ~Whalen v. Roe, 45 U.S.L.W. 4166, 4168 & n.22 (Feb. 22, 
1977); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (opinion 
of Powell, J.); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 184-85 
(1970) ' (Harlan, J., concurring); Fay v. New York, 332 u.s. 
261, 296 (1947). Various provisions of the Constitution, 
including the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause, of 
course place substantive limitations on the type of experimen-
tation a State may undertake. However, as the plurality 
admits, the crime of rape is second perhaps only to murder in 
its gravity. It follows then that Georgia did not approach 
such substantive constraints by enacting the statute here in 
question. See also Section (3) (b), infra. 
Statutory provisions in criminal justice used in one 
part of the country can be carefully watched by other state 
legislatures, so that the experience of one State becomes 
available to all. Although human lives are in the balance, 
it must be remembered that failure to allow flexibility may 
also jeopardize human lives -- those of the victims of undeterred 
criminal conduct. See pp. 22-23, infra. Our concern for the 
accused ought not foreclose legislative judgments showing 
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a modicum of consideration for the potential victims. 
Three State legislatures have, in the past five years, 
determined that human death and the devastating consequences 
of rape will be minimized if certain rapists are executed for 
10/ 
their offenses.-- That these States are presently a minority 
does not, in my view, make their judgment less worthy of 
deference. Our concern for human life must not be confined 
to the guilty; a State legislature is not to be thought 
insensitive to human values because it acts firmly to protect 
the lives and related values of the innocent. In this area, 
the choices for legislatures are at best painful and difficult 
and deserve a high degree of deference. Only last Term 
Mr. Justice White observed: 
"It will not do to denigrate the se legis-
lative judgments as some form of vestigal 
savagery or as purely retributive in motivation; 
for they are solemn judgments, reasonably based, 
that imposition of the death penalty will save 
the lives of innocent persons. This concern 
for life and human values and sincere efforts 
of the States to pursue them are matters of the 
greatest moment with which the judiciary should 
be most reluctant to interfe r e ." Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 428 u.s. at 325 (White, J., dissenting). 
(Emphasis· added.) 
The question of whether the death penalty is an appro-
priate punishment for rape is surely an open one. It is 
10/ The statute here in question does not provide 
--the death penalty for any and all rapists. Rather, 
the jury must find that at least one statutorily 
defined aggravated circumstance is present. Ga. 
Code Ann. §§ 26-3102, 27-2534.l(b) (1), (2) & (7). 
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arguable that many prospective rapists would be deterred 
by the possibility that they could suffer death for their 
offense; it is also arguable that the death penalty would have 
11/ 
only minimal deterrent effect.-- It may well be that rape 
victims would become more willing to report the crime and 
aid in the apprehension of the criminals if they knew that 
community disapproval of rapists was sufficiently strong to 
inflict the extreme penalty; or perhaps they would be reluctant 
to cooperate in the prosecution of rapists if they knew that 
a conviction might result in the imposition of the death 
penalty. Quite possibly, the occasional, well-publicized 
execution of egregious rapists may cause citizens to feel 
12/ 
greater security in their daily lives;-- or, on the contrary, 
11/ "The value of capital punishment as a 
-- deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue 
the resolution of which properly rests with 
the legislatures, which can evaluate the results 
of statistical studies in terms of their own 
local conditions and with a flexibility of approach 
that is not available to the courts. Furman v. 
Georgia _[408 U.S.], at 403-405 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting.)" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. at 186 
(plurality opinion). 
12/ "There are many cases in which the sordid, 
--heinous nature of a particular [rape], demeaning, 
humiliating, and often physically or psychologically 
traumatic, will call for public condemnation." 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 459 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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it may be that members of a civilized community will suffer 
the pangs of a heavy conscience because such punishment will 
1:1..1 
be perceived as excessive. We cannot know which among this 
range of possibilities is correct, but today's holding fore-
closes the very exploration we have said federalism was 
intended to foster. It is difficult to believe that Georgia 
would long remain alone in punishing rape by death if the 
next decade demonstrated a drastic reduction in the incidence 
of rape, an increased cooperation by rape victims in the apprehen-
sion and prosecution of rapists, and a greater confidence in 
the rule of law on the part of the populance. 
In order for any legislative program to develop it 
must be given time to take effect so that data may be evaluated 
for comparison with the experience of States which have not 
enacted death penalty statutes. Today, the Court repudiates 
Georgia's solemn judgment on how best to deal with the crime 
of rape before anyone cap know whether th~ _death penalty is 
an effective deterrent for one of the most horrible of all 
crimes. And this is done a few short years after Justice 
Powell's excellent statement: 
13/ Obviously I have no special competence to 
--make these judgme nts, but by the same token no 
other member of the Court is competent to make a 
contrary judgment. This is why our system has, 
until now, left these difficult policy choices 
to the state legislatures, who may be no wiser, but 
surely are more attuned to the mores of their com-
munities than are we. 
) 
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"In a period in our country's history when 
the frequency of [rape] is increasing alarmingly, 
it is indeed a grave event for the Court to take 
from the States whatever deterrent and retributive 
weight the death penalty retains." Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 u.s. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
To deprive states of this authority as the Court does, on the 
basis that "the current judgment with respect to the death 
penalty for rape ..• weighs very heavily on the side of 
rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping 
an adult woman," ante at 11, is impermissibly rash. The 
current judgment of some members of this Court has undergone 
14/ 
significant change in the short time since Furman.-- Social 
change on great issues generally reveals itself in small incre-
ments, and the "current judgment" of many States could well 
be altered on the basis of Georgia's experience, were we 
15/ 
to allow its statute to stand.--
15/ 
Indeed as recently as 1971 -- a year before 
Furman -- a majority of this Court appeared to 
have no doubt about the constitutionality of the 
death penalty. See McGautha v. California, 402 
u. s. 183 (1971). 
To paraphrase Mr. Justice Powell , "[w]hat 
[the Court is] saying, in effect, i 3 that 
the evolutionary process has come s 1denly 
to an end; that the ultimate wisdom a s to 
the appropriatene ss of capital punishment 
[for adult rape] under all circumstnaces, and 
for all future generations, has somehow been 
revealed." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 431 
(Powell, J., d i ssenting). 
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(b) 
The subjective judgment that the death penalty is 
simply disproportionate for the crime of rape is even more 
disturbing than the "objective" analysis discussed supra. 
The plurality's conclusion on this point is based upon the bare 
fact that murder necessarily results in the physical death 
o f the victim, while rape does not. Ante at 13, 15. However, 
no Member of the Court explains why this distinction has relevance, 
much less constitutional significance. It is, after all, 
not irrational -- nor constitutionally impermissible --
for a legislature to make the penalty more severe than the act 
16/ 
it punishes-- --as for example with the death penalty for 
17/ 
felony homicides-- -- in the hope it would deter future 
wrongdoing: 
"We may not require the legislature to select the 
least severe penalty possible so long as the pena lty 
selected is not crue lly inhuman or disproportiona te 
to the crime involved." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. at 153. Accord, Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S., 
at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
16 / For example, hardly any thief would be deterred 
from stealing if the only punishment upon being 
caught were return of the money stolen. 
17/ Only recently we declined to review the death penalty 
imposed under a felony murder statute on a 
participant who was not the "trigger man. 11 Smith v. 
Texas, No. 76-5854, cert.denied, March 8, 1976; 
Livingston v. Texas, No. 76-6326, cert. denied, 
May 23, 1976. 
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It begs the question to state, as does the plurality 
opinion: 
"Life is over for the victim of the murderers; for 
the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy 
as it was, but is not over and normally is not beyond 
repair." Ante at 13. 
Until now, the issue under the Eighth Amendment has not been 
the state of any particular victim after the crime, but rather 
whether the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate 
to the evil committed by the perpetrator. See, Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 
458 (Powell, J., dissenting). As a matter of constitutional 
principle, that test cannot have the primitive simplicity :· 
of "life . for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Rather 
States must be permitted to engage in a more sophisticated 
weighing of values in dealing with criminal activity which 
consistently poses grave danger of death or grave bodily 
harm. If innocent life and limb is to be preserved I see no 
constitutional barrier in punishing by death all who engage 
in such activity, regardless of whether the risk comes to 
fruition in any particular instance. See Packer, supra, 
77 Harv. L. Rev . at 1077-79. 
Only one year ago the Court held it constitutionally 
permissible to impose the death penalty for the crime of 
murder, provided that certain procedural safeguards are 
followed. Compare Gregg v. Georgia, supra, Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 
262 (1976) with Roberts v. Louisiana, supra and Woodson v. 
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North Carolina, supra. Today, the Court readily admits that 
"[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of 
self.'" Ante at 12. Moreover, as stated by Mr. Justice 
Powell, 
"[t]he threat of serious injury is implicit in 
the definition of rape; the victim is either forced 
into submission by physical violence or by the threat 
of violence." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 460. 
Rape thus is not a crime "light-years" removed from murder 
in the degree of its heinousness; it certainly poses a serious 
potential danger to the life and safety of innocent victims 
apart from the devasting psychic consequences. It would 
seem to follow therefore that, affording the States proper 
18/ 
leeway under the broad standard of the Eighth Amendment,--
18/ Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for himself, Mr. 
-- ·Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Stevens in 
Gregg v. Georgia noted that "in assessing a 
punishment selected by a democratically elected 
legislature against the constitutional measure 
[of the Eighth Amendment], we presume its 
validity . . A heavy burden rests on those 
who would attack ·the judgment of the representatives 
of the people." 428 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added.) 
Accord, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 451 (Powell, 
J., dissenting) . 
The reasons for this special deference to State 
legislative enactments was described: 
"This is true in part because the constitutional 
test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary 
standarqs and the legislative judgment weighs heavily 
in ascertaining such standards. "[I]n a democratic 
society legislatures, not courts, are constituted 
to respond to the will and consequently the moral 
values of the people.' Furman v. Georgia, [408 U.S.], 
at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)." Id. at 175-176. 
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murder is properly punishable by death, rape should be also, 
if that is the considered judgment of the legislators. 
The Court's conclusion to the contrary is very 
disturbing indeed. The clear implication of today's holding 
appears to be that the death penalty may be properly imposed 
only as to crimes resulting in death of the victim. This 
casts ~erious doubt upon the constitutional validity of 
statutes imposing the death penalty for a variety of conduct 
which, though dangerous, may not necessarily result in any 
immediate death, ~, treason, airplane hijacking, and 
kidnapping. In that respect, today's holding does even mor e 
harm that is initially apparent. We cannot avoid judicial 
notice that crimes such as airplane hijacking, kidnapping, 
and mass terrorist activity constitute a serious and increa sing 
danger to the safety of the public. It would be unfortunate 
indeed but quite likely -- that the effect of today's 
holding would be to inhibit States and th~~ederal Gove rnment 
from experimenting with various remedies -- including 
possibly imposition of the penalty of death -- to prevent and 
deter such crimes. 
Some sound observations, made only a few years ago, 
deserve repetition: 
"Our task here, as must so frequently be 
emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass 
upon the constitutionality of legislation 
that has been enacted and that is challenged. 
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This is the sole task for judges. We should not allow 
our personal preferences as to the wisdom of 
legislative and congressional action, on our 
distaste for such action, to guide our judicial 
decision in cases such as these. The temptations 
to cross that policy line are very great. In fact, 
as today's decision reveals, they are almost irresistible." 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) . 
Whatever our individual views as to the wisdom of 
capital punishment, I cannot agree that it is constitutionally 
impermissible for a State legislature to make the "solemn 
judgments" to impose the death penalty for the crime of rape. 
Accordingly, I would leave to the States the task of legis-
lating in this area of the law. 
CHAMBERS' OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.;§u:putttt <!J onrl d flrt ~!b .;§tmes 
._asfri:ngLm. ~. Qf. 2.llgt~~ 
June 17, 1977 
Re: No. 75-5444 - Coker v. Georgia 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, ; -~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~.npunu <!Jcnrl d flrt ~ ~htt~.&' 
.... M'Jringhtn, ~. <!J. 2!l.;t'!-~ 
C HAMBE R S OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEV E NS 
June 17, 1977 
Re: 75-5444 - Coker v. Georgia 
Dear Chief: 
It is a small point, but you may wish to correct 
the references in footnotes 8 and 18 to Potter as the 
author of the plurality opinion in Gregg, since it was 
actually a joint project. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Powell 
.§uvunu ~on.rt of tqt %tift2t .§ta.Ug 
~et$Jrittgbnt, ~. ~· ' ZO~J-1$ FILE COPY 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
June 28, 1977 
No. 75-5444 Coker v. Georgia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
PLEASE RETURN 
TO FILE 
In view of additions to the Chief Justice's dissent 
(e.g., p. 4 and 5 n. 2), I am adding to footnote 1 in my 
little opinion two additional paragraphs as enclosed. 





lfp/ss 6/28/77 Coker 
The dissent of the Chief Justice, relying on 
selected excerpts from my opinion in Furman, seeks to 
buttress the view that for sentencing purposes a 
meaningful distinction cannot be drawn between rapes 
regardless of the circumstances and effect upon the 
victim. Post, at 4, n. 2. The dissent emphasizes the 
difficulties of proof. But the jury system is designed 
and operates successfully to resolve precisely this type 
of factual issue. The law of negligence, for example , is . 
replete with issues requiring the jury to determine 
degrees of culpability and the extent or permanency of 
physical and psychological injury. 
I am complimented by the frequency with which the 
Chief Justice, in his dissent, cites and quotes from my 
opinion in Furman. That opinion, however, did not 
prevail, and - as with most of the writing in Furman - it 
now must be read in light of Gregg and Woodson, which have 
established the controlling general principles. But 
contrary to implications in the Chief Justice's dissent, 
my opinion in Furman did emphasize that the 
proportionality test as to rape should be applied on a 
case-by-case basis, noting that in some cases the death 
sentence would be "g rossly excessive ." Furman , supra, at 
461. I remain 1n disagreement with the simplistic 
all-or-nothing views of the plurality opinion and the 
dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice. 
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